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ABSTRACT 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 calls for improving the security of 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) and other control systems which 
operate the critical infrastructure of the United States.  In the past, these industrial 
computer systems relied on security through obscurity.  Recent economic and technical 
shifts within the controls industry have increased their vulnerability to cyber attack.  
Concurrently, their value as a target has been recognized by terrorist organizations and 
competing nation states.   
Network reconnaissance is a basic tool that allows computer security managers to 
understand their complex systems.  However, existing reconnaissance tools incorporate 
little or no understanding of control systems.  This thesis provides a conceptual analysis 
for the creation of a SCADA network exploration/reconnaissance tool.  Several 
reconnaissance techniques were researched and reviewed in a laboratory environment to 
determine their utility for SCADA system discovery.  Additionally, an application 
framework using common non-SCADA security tools was created to provide a proof of 
concept.  Development of a viable tool for identifying SCADA systems remotely will 
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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS 
 
Amap A network reconnaissance tool specifically designed to discover 
application information on TCP/IP networks. 
Actuator A physical field device used to cause change in a process. 
Analog A description of data represented by continuously variable, 
measurable, physical quantities, such as length, width, voltage, or 
pressure. 
Automation System The generic term for the hardware, software, and procedures used to 
control, monitor, and record any automated physical system.  This 
includes security, robotic, process control and SCADA type systems.  
For this thesis, it is synonymous with control system and SCADA. 
Bit A discrete unit of measure having one of two possible values, typically 
described as 0 or 1. 
Byte A set of eight bits. 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection – An area of study concerned with 
protecting industrial, commercial and military infrastructure 
Controller A device that takes process input and determines appropriate actions 
to output. 
Control System The generic term for the hardware, software, and procedures used to 
control, monitor, and record manufacturing and industrial processes. 
Control Network A generic term for a network that carries control system data 
Critical Infrastructure Physical infrastructure deemed by a society as essential to its effective 
operation. 
DCS Distributed Control System – A control system consisting of multiple 
localized process control systems, synonymous with SCADA system 
for this thesis. 
Digital A description of data represented as a sequence of discrete symbols 
from a finite set, such as “true/false” or “on/off”. 
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol version 3 – A standard describing 
communications in a control system. 
Ethernet A networking standard (IEEE 802.3) at the Layer 2 of the OSI model, 
used for local network routing. 
Ethernet/IP Ethernet Industrial Protocol – A standard for encapsulating control 
system information in a TCP/IP network. 
Field Instrumentation A sensor or actuator; a device that directly monitors or controls a 
process or environment. 
Fieldbus Generic term for a local control system network, generally between 
controllers and field instruments. 
 xvi
Firewall A network security device whose purpose is to filter out any traffic 
which does not follow prescribed rules. 
Foundation Fieldbus A control system networking standard specifically directed towards 
communications between controllers and field instruments. 
Historian A computer system tasked with storing data collected from a SCADA 
system for historical review. 
HMI Human Machine Interface – A device where a human can interact with 
an automated system. 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority – An organization that oversees 
IP address allocation and TCP port number assignments across the 
Internet. 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers – An international 
professional organization for the advancement of technology related to 
electricity.  A leader in the development of standards concerning 
electronic communications. 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force – A professional organization that 
develops and promotes standards on the Internet. 
IP Internet Protocol – A layer 3 protocol of the OSI networking 
framework, charged with routing of communications between 
localized networks. 
ISA Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation society – A professional 
organization dedicated to setting standards in the instrumentation and 
automation industry. 
IT Information Technology – A generic term for computer hardware, 
software and networking technologies. 
LAN Local Area Network – A generic term for a network of devices within 
relatively close proximity of each other.  A VLAN is a virtualized 
LAN, where two LAN’s are carried on the same physical medium but 
are logically isolated.  A WLAN is a wireless LAN, where the 
physical medium of the LAN uses radio communications. 
MAC Address Media Access Control address – A unique identifier for an Ethernet 
NIC, consists of a 48-bit number.  The number has a unique prefix 
assigned to every manufacturer by the IEEE. 
Modbus/IP A standard describing communications in a control system, 
specifically updates an earlier serial protocol (Modbus) to be used on a 
TCP/IP network. 
Network Port A separation of communications on a network.  This can be done 




The process of remotely discovering information about a computer 
network and the devices connected to it. 
NIC Network Interface Card – Hardware component for communicating 
between a computer or other electronic device and a network. 
 xvii
NIDS Network Intrusion Detection System – A software and hardware 
system whose purpose is to detect and monitor illicit network 
communications. 
Nmap A network reconnaissance tool specifically designed to find systems 
on a TCP/IP network. 
OSI 7-Layer Model Open System Interconnection model that defines a networking 
framework for implementing protocols in seven layers of abstraction. 
OUI Organizationally Unique Identifier – The manufacturer’s 24-bit 
identification prefix portion of a MAC address. 
PCS Process Control System – Another term for a control system, usually 
applied to a system involving processing of a raw material to a 
finished form. 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller – A standalone control system that 
processes information from sensors to control actuators. 
Profinet A standard describing communications in a control system, 
specifically updates an earlier protocol (Profibus) for use on a TCP/IP 
network. 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit – An electronic device where input and output 
from sensors and actuators are aggregated and translated onto a 
network. 
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition – Another term for a 
control system, usually applied to distributed systems which manage 
other localized control systems.  For this thesis, it is synonymous with 
control system. 
Sensor An instrument used to measure or detect change in a process or 
environment, such as a pressure meter or video camera. 
Snort A software implementation of a NIDS that can be used to identify 
specific types of network traffic and alert users. 
TCP Transport Control Protocol – A layer 4 protocol of the OSI networking 
framework, the first layer that can define application specific 
information. 
TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol – A suite of protocols for 
network communications. 
TCP Port A logical network port, consisting of a numerical assignment set aside 
for a specific application within the TCP protocol. 
UDP User Datagram Protocol – A layer 4 protocol of the OSI networking 
framework.  It does not provide the reliability and ordering guarantee 
that TCP does but requires less administrative overhead. 
WAN Wide Area Network – A physically disparate network, generally a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the critical infrastructure of the United States is controlled by industrial 
computer systems that are vulnerable to computer attack.  Presidential Decision Directive 
63 identifies this problem and directs the federal government to address it.1  These 
control systems, also known as Supervisor Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), 
often rely on outdated methods of communication to operate.  Much of this network 
infrastructure does not provide for any significant information assurance for the control 
system communications.  Instead it relies on security through obscurity and that depends 
only on an attacker’s ignorance.2  One method to protect these vulnerable control systems 
is to hide them behind network perimeter defenses.  Reconnaissance tools that verify 
those protections are essential.3   
Computerized control systems have been a significant boost to the productivity of 
industry.  The information revolution of the past thirty years has been applied to great 
effect in factories, refineries, pipelines, power plants, distribution centers, and even 
buildings.  There exist automated systems that control many of these critical 
infrastructure elements which are now integrated into management information systems 
using modern communications and computer technology.  Integration has exposed the 
SCADA systems to threats from the corporate information systems that were previously 
held at bay by isolation. 
Control systems may never run in isolation from corporate IT infrastructures 
again.  As it takes many years for new security conscious technical solutions to be 
developed and fielded, the vulnerable systems may remain so indefinitely.  Because some 
of these exposed systems lack intrinsic information assurance controls, the SCADA and 
security communities cannot expect to apply many standard security techniques, hence 
                                                 
1 Presidential Decision Directive 63, reaffirmed in Executive Order 13231 and then Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 
2 Arden Bement, 1. 
3 See Dorothy Denning, 372-373, for a discussion on the necessity of vulnerability analysis and 
network scanning tools.  Additionally, reconnaissance tools are a network analysis tool which can be used 
to “monitor the integrity of the system”, a requirement of the Department of Defense 8510.1-M Security 
Test and Evaluation Task 3-2 Level 1 Checklist used to accredit military computer networks. 
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the need to use other methods of protection.  In this situation, those with malicious intent 
should be denied access to the vulnerable systems at the network level.  One way of 
achieving this isolation within the framework of the Internet is to use firewalls, network 
intrusion detection systems, virtual private networks, and other security controls to 
achieve a balance between information security and the utility of SCADA integration.   
Reconnaissance tools are an essential element for validating the effectiveness of 
network perimeter security controls.  They test firewalls to ensure that an attacker is 
unable to learn any information about what is behind them.  They monitor the network 
for any control system devices placed on it without the knowledge of security personnel.  
They expose network configuration errors that allow back-channel communication.  
While the value of network reconnaissance tools is well known by security professionals, 
very little has been done to customize them to a SCADA environment. 
In this thesis, I describe the research I did into control systems’ vulnerabilities, 
threats, and mitigation methods.  Additionally, I measured the effectiveness of certain 
reconnaissance methods in a SCADA environment and demonstrated a prototype network 
exploration tool.  I showed that the information presented in this thesis will enable 
network security professionals and researchers to glean important information about their 
SCADA systems from the overwhelming torrent of general network traffic.   
 
 












Can I get to the web pages? 
Can I control the pump? 
Can I get to the email? 
FIREWALL 
Nope, I’m OK. 
Nope, I’m OK. 
Nope, I’m OK. 
YES!!! ACK!!! 
 3
In the second chapter of this thesis, I delve into some background on SCADA 
systems.  In Chapter III, I detail four methods of developing reconnaissance information 
remotely.  Next in Chapter IV, I discuss development of the prototype control system 
recon tool, SCADAScan.  After that in Chapter V, I describe detailed results produced 
during use of the reconnaissance methods and the new application in the lab.  Finally in 
Chapter VI, I discuss our conclusions and propositions for future work.  The main body 
of the thesis is followed by appendices detailing the information gathered and the 
application development work.  In Appendix A, I cover the MAC prefixes; in Appendix 
B, SCADA service ports; in Appendix C, service interrogation; in Appendix D, 
equipment profiling; in Appendix E, Snort configurations; in Appendix F, source code for 
the prototype tool.  
The reader is expected to have some knowledge of information security, computer 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. SCADA SYSTEMS 
The nation’s economy and the safety of its citizens depend on the security of 
SCADA systems.  SCADA is a group of technologies that automate many manufacturing 
facilities and portions of the critical infrastructure of the United States.  These industrial 
computer systems enable efficient control over factories, refineries, water pipelines, 
weapons systems, and thousands of other critical applications.  Because they are so 
important and have such an impact on our lives, they are threatened by malicious assault.   
Recent developments in SCADA technologies and certain economic forces have 
increased their vulnerability to remote exploitation.4  Information security professionals 
need the tools to protect these systems.  Network reconnaissance tools that can identify 
vulnerable systems remotely are necessary in order to find unprotected SCADA systems.  
Research efforts have been started that will help secure these vital assets and SCADA 
reconnaissance tools will aid in this process.  Having a higher degree of assurance that 
only authorized entities can use our SCADA systems will give confidence in the security 
of this critical infrastructure. 
 
1. What are SCADA Systems 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems are computers, controllers, 
instruments, actuators, networks, and interfaces that manage the control of automated 
industrial processes and allow analysis of those systems through data collection.  They 
come in all forms and sizes, from gigantic installations that launch satellites to room 
thermostats.  They are used in all types of industries, from electrical distribution systems, 
to food processing, to facility security alarms.  They are used in military, government, 
and civilian applications.  They run the power plants of aircraft carriers, the gates of 
prisons, the traffic lights of cities, the air conditioning of hospitals, and the bottling plants 
of breweries.  SCADA systems are ubiquitous and vital to our way of life.  Without them, 
many things that we take for granted would be impossible. 
                                                 
4 Ronald Krutz, 16. 
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In the words of the Department of Homeland Security United States Computer 
Emergency Response Team’s Control Systems Security Program (US-CERT CSSP): 
Control systems (also referred to as SCADA, DCS, PCS, etc.) are 
computer-based systems used within many of our nation’s critical 
infrastructures to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical 
functions.  “Control Systems” is a generic term applied to hardware, 
firmware, communications and software that are used to monitor and 
control vital functions of physical systems.  In this vein, cyber attacks are 
defined as the penetration of control systems via any communication 
pathway in such a manner as to manipulate the control process with the 
intent to cause harm or disrupt operations.5 
As mentioned above SCADA is referred to by many different names.  Although 
there might be technical differences between the terms, for the purposes of this thesis, all 
of them are functionally equivalent. 
Some SCADA systems are so simple that they barely qualify to be called 
“supervisory”; others consist of hundreds of computers tightly integrated together over 
the Internet.  This second group tends to be some of the most critical, including such 
systems as rail traffic control and sewage treatment.  These SCADA systems often form 
networks that tie together information from their processes, enterprise wide resource 
planning programs, and corporate accounting systems.  This cross connection has opened 
up the SCADA portion of these systems to threats originating from the wider information 
infrastructure.  Because more and more SCADA information is carried over the Internet 
and is no longer contained within controlled local area networks, critical data is now 
vulnerable to manipulation by external and possibly malicious elements. 
 
2. The Importance of SCADA 
In his book, “At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War,” Thomas Reed, 
Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of the Air Force, described a SCADA related incident in the 
USSR.  Valves and pumps were deliberately influenced through a SCADA system to 
create a pipeline rupture that created the “most monumental non-nuclear explosion and 
                                                 
5 Computer Emergency Readiness Team Control System Security Plan (US-CERT CSSP) homepage 
http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/ (accessed July 18, 2006). 
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fire ever seen from space.”6  Much of the critical infrastructure of the United States is 
controlled by similar systems.  Additionally, countless smaller scale process control 
systems maintain the economic engine of the nation.7  SCADA systems are relied upon to 
operate safety critical systems such as fire control panels and nuclear reactors.  SCADA 
technologies have been a significant boon to the national economy, but disrupting them 
or manipulating them maliciously can have very serious economical, material, political, 
and personal consequences.8   
While protecting SCADA systems is important, this must always be balanced by 
maintaining their utility.  Drastic security measures that would deny valid access to a 
SCADA system would be harmful.  Any new security control must maintain the 
performance and functionality of the system it protects. 
 
3. Elements of a SCADA System 
SCADA systems can be very large, diverse and geographically distributed, but 
they do tend to contain many of the same components.  In this thesis, I categorized them 
into five general groups of devices depending upon task.  They are: 
• Controllers 
• Field Instruments 
• Remote Terminating Units (RTUs)  
• Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs)  
• Control Networks.   
Other research has delimited control systems in differing ways.9  Generally, they 
divide the system by physical location consisting of remote units and master controllers.  
This conceptualization connotes a large physical separation that is not the case under the 
                                                 
6 Thomas Reed, 268-269. 
7 William Terry 
8 Government Accounting Office (May 2004), 36-37. 
9 Ward, 3.  Krutz, 7. 
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definition of a SCADA system within this thesis.  SCADA network security should be 
concerned with protecting information among all of the functional groups regardless of 
their physical proximity.  Otherwise, the need to protect local control system networks, 
also known as fieldbuses, would be overlooked.  Therefore, for our purposes, it is better 
to look at these systems using a functional grouping.  See Figure 2 for examples of some 
control systems and their elements. 
 
 



































Instrumentation Network (Fieldbus) 
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a. Controllers 
Controllers are computers that are specifically tasked with managing an 
industrial process.  They can be normal pc-type workstations with specialized software, 
but most are dedicated industrial-grade computers called Programmable Logic 
Controllers (PLCs).  PLCs are marketed for their reliability, not their computing power.  
Therefore, many have less processing power than a ten-year-old home computer and lack 
many elements taken for granted in such systems such as security relevant hardware.  
Controllers are the brains of a SCADA system, providing the decision-making 
capabilities. 
 
b. Field Instrumentation 
Corresponding to input into and output from the system, sensors and 
actuators are the two types of field instrumentation devices.  As the name implies, sensors 
are the senses of a control system, bringing in information about the physical 
environment.  Conversely, actuators are the hands, causing change to the world. 
Sensors can be almost any type of measuring device, from voiceprint 
analyzers to photoelectric sensors, as long as they can give information to the SCADA 
system.  These instruments measure real-world physical conditions and turn them into the 
bits and bytes understandable by computers.  Actuators are commanded by controllers to 
cause some physical effect.  This can be most any type of action, from sounding alarms 
and moving robot arms to igniting rockets and stopping conveyer belts.  Actuators 
convert the bits and bytes of computers into real-world conditions. 
 
c. Remote Terminal Units 
For instruments and actuators that are physically proximate to each other, 
RTUs consolidate information and control signals so that they can be communicated to as 
a group.  They provide a bridge between the controllers and field devices.  Some RTUs 
have their own controllers, sensors, and actuators combined into a single package, while 
others gather data for systems thousands of miles away.  Examples of RTUs are 
 10
Intelligent Instrumentation’s EDAS devices, an Ethernet switch, and an Allen-Bradley 
1746-NIO4V analog input/output module. 
 
d. Human Machine Interfaces 
HMIs provide the interface between people and the automated systems.  
They are devices that show an operator the status of the process and then allow them to 
control it.  They can be simple lights and switches or they can have full multi-media 
interactions with the user.  They need to be effective at demonstrating the status of the 
controlled process and permit timely user response to events.  Examples include alarm 
bells, computer screens, Invesys Wonderware (a software user-interface development 
application), push buttons, keyboards, fingerprint readers, and so on. 
HMIs can also collect the data generated by the SCADA system over time, 
creating a historical record of the controlled process.  These logs can then be reviewed for 
pertinent management and process information.  This information can be used for quality 
control, to bill customers, to demonstrate production goals, to find inefficiencies, to 
attribute liability, and so on.  These HMIs, also called historians, include such things as 
production databases, control system data gathering and storage applications such as 
Rockwell-Automation RSSql, product counters, operator log books, and production 
graphs. 
 
e. Control Networks 
Electronic Information networks are used to move information from RTUs 
to controllers to HMIs.  These can be independent, isolated networks serving only the 
SCADA system, or they can be fully integrated inside a corporate IT infrastructure.  
SCADA information can be carried over wide-area networks to remote facilities, 
transmitted over wireless connections to mobile equipment, and run on the same network 
as corporate email.  Older SCADA networks include RS-485, Profibus, DH+, DecNet, 
and modem communication.  Newer ones include Ethernet/IP, Profinet, ControlNet, and 
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standard TCP/IP networks.10  Control networks are the nervous system of SCADA, 
transporting information and commands between the “brains” and the “hands”. 
This thesis focuses on the control networks and what information can be 
gathered about the rest of the control system from the traffic carried on them.  However, 
it is important to know all of the elements of a SCADA system when discussing them, 
especially as the boundaries between the elements are often blurred.  Discussions on the 
elements of a SCADA system help to understand the entire process and how to ensure 
adequate protection mechanisms throughout. 
 
4. SCADA System Vulnerabilities 
Unfortunately, the very utility of these systems has made them vulnerable.  
SCADA is relatively unknown outside of its various industry communities; because of 
this, control engineers did not think that their systems required computer security 
controls.11  Thus, for much of their history, SCADA installations have relied on security 
through obscurity, the practice of depending on an adversary’s ignorance for protection.12  
In fact, many corporate IT managers do not even know that their networks carry such 
vital information.13  The relatively insular nature of the industrial control community 
contributes to the lack of security.14  Many control system technologies are proprietary or 
consist of highly specialized components, and thus require specific training and 
education.  Often SCADA experts come from process or mechanical engineering 
backgrounds, instead of having computer science or information security backgrounds.15  
Thus, although controls engineers are very good at what they do, they were not prepared 
for the new technologies and dangers that the information revolution brought them. 
 
                                                 
10 Krutz, 50-63. 
11 Krutz, 73. 
12 Krutz, 73-74. 
13 Presenters discussion in “What is the Real Threat to SCADA Systems”, February 22, 2006, 
http://www6.sans.org/SANS/20060222/rnh.htm (accessed June 30, 2006). 
14 Hilldick-Smith, 7. 
15 Hilldick-Smith, 7. 
 12
a. Legacy Systems 
The lack of wider information system knowledge and the economic need 
to improve efficiencies has led to the premature adoption of new technologies within 
SCADA systems.  Thus, most of the standard communication protocols used by 
controllers, RTUs, and HMIs have woefully inadequate information assurance.  In other 
words:  
Often the security of SCADA systems is based solely on the secrecy of 
these protocols.  Unfortunately, obscure protocols provide very little real 
security.16  
Most have no provisions to provide the basic information security 
attributes of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability.  These characteristics 
of a secure communications protocol are necessary to ensure that malicious manipulation 
of information does not occur.  Confidentiality is required in a SCADA system so that 
proprietary data is not viewed by unauthorized parties.  Integrity is paramount; the 
devices that communicate on these networks must ensure they are providing each other 
the correct information.  They must also guarantee that the parties that are controlling 
them are authentic; in other words, that those manipulating the process are authorized to 
do so.  Even though a well-designed control system will be operationally self-contained, 
serious issues arise when separate control processes cannot communicate with each other.   
Historically, having no security was sometimes necessary, because the 
communicating equipment was not powerful enough to accommodate security measures.  
For example, encryption has been the most widely used method for securing 
communications and many older PLC processors lack either the algorithmic or 
performance capabilities to provide such services.  If authentication controls existed, 
sharing of passwords was a common practice or vendor “back-doors” were hard coded 
into the hardware.17  Secondly, biometric, token, and other methods of two- or three-
factor authentication are often not practical in an industrial environment.18  Dust can 
                                                 
16 Krutz, 91. 
17 Hildick-Smith, 8, and author’s experience 
18 Authentication factors are: something you know, something you have, and something you are.  For 
example, I know a password, I have a keycard, and I have a matching thumbprint.  Multi-factor 
authentication uses more than one of these elements to prove an identity. 
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block identification sensors and magnetic strip cards can be degaussed by high voltage 
electrical equipment.  The lack of authentication has led to systems with no 
accountability and thus no security. 
Many control networks assume a fully trustworthy environment.  For 
much of SCADA history, designers could be assured that there was little malicious intent 
within their systems.  Additionally, installations were geographically and logically 
isolated from the rest of the corporation.  Any networking outside the direct control of the 
users was over private leased lines.  There was little, if any, integration with other 
information systems.  The myth was that only authorized users knew the SCADA system 
was there and they had no incentive to damage it.  Unfortunately, as described above, the 
isolation that SCADA enjoyed is a thing of the past. 
 
b. Integration with Business Systems 
Economic incentives have caused SCADA systems to be put into 
vulnerable positions.19  They are now integrated with external systems, becoming 
standardized with each other, and are inter-networked within themselves.  Today, it is 
common that the factory automation system is connected directly to the corporate 
information infrastructure.20  Information from the control systems flows directly into 
other corporate databases and is used to improve the overall efficiency.   
As a system is only as strong as its weakest link, integrated SCADA 
systems are vulnerable to the full spectrum of typical computer security problems.  
Adding to the severity of this situation, vulnerabilities in control systems cannot be 
patched with the frequency of business systems.21  The availability of a SCADA system 
is paramount; taking it offline to fix is often not acceptable.  Even worse, low quality 
fixes and lack of testing generate an environment where “reports of patch-induced 
problems that cause systems to crash or take severe performance hits creates reluctance 
                                                 
19 Krutz, 16-17 
20 Hildick-Smith, 8.  Eisenhauer, 10. 
21 Krutz, 17 
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[to update the software].”22  There are now SCADA systems that rely on common 
operating systems and are susceptible to the typical worms and viruses targeted against 
them.  An example of this vulnerability occurred in 2003 when a common Internet virus, 
Sobig, disrupted freight and commuter rail operations in the metro Washington, D.C. 
area.23  Thus, attacks not targeted towards SCADA systems can affect them through their 
interconnections with other business systems. 
 
c. Accessibility 
Today, there are geographically dispersed systems communicating over 
public networks to potentially insecure locations.  An interview with 50 water utilities in 
the mid-90’s concluded that “60% reported that they could control their systems from a 
dial-up line”.24  The efficiency gains from this interconnection also increase the 
vulnerability of these systems to malicious assault. 
SCADA systems were some of the first users of large scale information 
networks.  The need to control dispersed physical hardware from a central location, such 
as with an electrical power grid, prompted the development of traditional supervisory 
control and data acquisition systems.  These first installations used private leased phone 
lines and microwave relay stations, thus maintaining isolation of the control information.  
Unfortunately, the network utilization of these closed communications systems was low.  
Therefore, it became economically desirable to send this information over shared network 
links.  This has progressed to the point that SCADA systems routinely rely on the Internet 
to communicate.25  Thus, the information crosses uncontrolled boundaries and is 
vulnerable to interception or disruption.26 
Another concern with dispersed and physically remote portions of a 
system is that direct access to them might not be up to the same standards as at the 
                                                 
22 Hildick-Smith, 8. 
23 Krutz, 75. 
24 Hildick-Smith, 8. 
25 Krutz, 139-140 
26 North American Electric Reliability Council. 
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primary location.27  For example, in large electrical distribution applications many 
endpoints of the SCADA system are in distant, unmanned switching stations.  These 
locations may permit easy physical access to the control system.  While there might be a 
guard at the control center, a cipher lock on the server room, and background checks on 
the control engineers, it could be that the only thing required to enter a substation is to 
open the gate.  Once physical access is gained, most information systems are easily 
compromised. 
Also, laying physical wiring can be quite expensive in an industrial 
environment.  Therefore, it is very tempting to use wireless communications to network 
the controls.  As physical access is not required to intercept data, wireless transmission is 
innately less secure than wired.  Additionally, many common wireless communications 
standards have been rife with vulnerabilities.28  Finally, electrical interference or 
malicious frequency jamming can reduce the reliability of radio transmission.  While 
wireless SCADA is economically desirable and can be required by the situation, the 
security implications must be fully understood and mitigated. 
 
d. Standardization 
At the same time that SCADA systems have become more inter- and intra-
connected, they are becoming more standardized.  Customers have demanded that 
vendors stop producing fully proprietary systems and start cooperating to create products 
that can work seamlessly and interchangeably.  This has led to the development of 
several communications standards and a host of devices that can speak the same 
protocols.  While this cooperation has created much more efficient installations, it has 
also concentrated knowledge and vulnerabilities.29   
Not only are SCADA systems becoming standardized with each other, 
many are now using common technologies from the wider information technology 
community.  For example, many critical infrastructure control systems now use modern 
                                                 
27 Personal experience of the author 
28 Andrea Bittau 
29 Krutz, 50. 
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IP based communication protocols such as TCP/IP and Ethernet.  Sometimes, the old 
proprietary protocol is just encapsulated into such networks, other times it is the primary 
means of communication.  The cost savings from using these more common devices in a 
SCADA situation can be significant.  SCADA network interface cards for proprietary 
networks often cost ten to a hundred times more than a common LAN network card.30  
Additionally, the performance of standard information technologies has outstripped their 
SCADA cousins; typical propriety systems transfer data at less than 10 Mbps compared 
to 100 Mbps in a basic IT network.31  This makes it very tempting to use the generic 
devices within the critical infrastructure systems.  But, by using the more common 
systems, a wider threat base is created. 
 
e. Knowledge of SCADA 
In the past, the esoteric nature of SCADA precluded knowledge in these 
systems from going beyond the industrial community.  This does not hold true in the 
information age.  As control systems use more ubiquitous technologies, the knowledge of 
those systems and their vulnerabilities becomes more wide-spread.  Additionally, the 
Internet has allowed access to vendor and even installation specific information to be at 
the fingertips of anyone with access to an Internet search engine.  Finally, the value of 
SCADA systems is becoming more understood by the malicious hacking community.  
The obscurity that protected SCADA is rapidly diminishing. 
Propriety protocols and expensive hardware acted as a deterrent to control 
system neophytes.  Only those with significant motivation tended to become educated 
about the subject.  As the technologies become cheaper and more standardized, it requires 
less knowledge and skill to accomplish assaults on control systems.  Considerable 
knowledge can be gleaned from freely available vendor documentation.  Additionally, 
information on specific systems and installations can be taken from project websites.32  
                                                 
30 For example, a NIC for the ControlNet protocol costs >$500 while a standard Internet protocol NIC 
is <$50. 
31 Continuing the above example, the ControlNet protocol operates at a maximum of 5 Mbps while the 
cheap Internet protocol NIC typically runs at 100 Mbps. 
32 Eisenhauer, 10. 
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The importance of SCADA system security has been identified not only by industry and 
government, but also by the criminal community.  The ease of breaking certain systems 
has been a focus at several recent computer security gatherings.  While these meetings 
attempt to disseminate information about improving security, they are also attended by 
those that will use the knowledge to break into computers instead of protect them.33  The 
information age has allowed significant gains in productivity, but can expose systems that 
rely on ignorance for security. 
 
f. Ignorance of SCADA Security Issues 
Many security issues can be mitigated with the application of appropriate 
security controls.  Unfortunately, most controls engineers are not educated concerning 
information security.  Additionally, many IT security engineers are not educated about 
control systems.  Finally, modern control systems can be enormously complex and 
difficult to analyze.  All of these vulnerabilities can be ameliorated by more education 
and training. 
Controls engineers specialize in the development and operation of 
SCADA systems.  They tend to focus on reliability and availability which are often in 
conflict with security controls.  With this outlook, requirements such as typing a 
password are considered operational hindrances.  In fact, many of these engineers are not 
familiar with more general IT and “the important role of developing security policies can 
be a foreign concept to typical SCADA staff.”34   
The lack of experience with IT security ends up generating control 
networks without the protections necessary.  In many cases, SCADA engineers are not 
aware of the security concerns associated with using standard IT systems.35  Network 
monitoring and defense devices are often omitted or configured incorrectly.  Network 
                                                 
33 A discussion on breaking into a water supply system is at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/20/we_have_your_water_supply/.  Another at: 
http://www.toorcon.org/2005/conference.html?id=16 (both accessed June 27, 2006). 
34 Hildick-Smith, 8. 
35 Jason Stamp et al., 7. 
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Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), firewall, and anti-virus software are not used.36  
Even when fielded, most of these devices are not aware of SCADA protocols or issues.  
As their worlds converge, control and IT security engineers must work together to protect 
their systems. 
For all IT systems, including SCADA, the more complex a system is the 
harder it is to secure it.  Many modern control systems are extremely complex, involving 
hundreds of PLCs working with thousands of instruments.37  Add in interconnections 
with databases and other enterprise systems, and it becomes impossible to guarantee 
security.38  An attacker need only find one weakness in a system’s defenses; the defender 
must take steps to mitigate threats from all directions. 
 
5. Threats to SCADA Systems 
As mentioned earlier, at the same time that the line between SCADA systems and 
more common information technologies is blurring, the recognition that control systems 
are excellent targets has been growing.  While there have not been events with loss of life 
so far, it is only a matter of time before a significant information security event takes 
place involving the misuse of SCADA resources.   
There are many theoretical examples of the effects that malicious attacks might 
have on SCADA.  These scenarios include assaults on petroleum refining, nuclear power 
generation, conventional electrical power generation, petroleum wellhead pump control, 
water purification systems, crane control, corporate systems, and chemical plants.39  
Additionally, there are several documented incidents where critical infrastructure control 
systems were directly impacted.  These include the disabling of a safety critical system at 
a nuclear plant, the release of raw sewage, and blocking all control signals to an electrical 
utility.40  Currently, the Group for Advanced Information Technology at the British 
                                                 
36 Hildick-Smith, 8. 
37 Presenters discussion in “What is the Real Threat to SCADA Systems”, February 22, 2006, 
http://www6.sans.org/SANS/20060222/rnh.htm (accessed June 30, 2006). 
38 Eisenhauer, 10. 
39 Krutz, 23-38. 
40 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  Eric Byres (October 2004).  NERC, 1. 
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Columbia Institute of Technology maintains a database of industrial computer security 
incidents.  This project attempts to collect known threats to SCADA systems.  It has 
shown a significant rise in reported incidents over recent years.41  
  
a. Malware 
Computer viruses, worms, trojans and spyware are the bane of standard IT 
systems.  As SCADA systems incorporate more and more generic IT technology into 
their installation, they become more vulnerable to threats from malware.  Attacks 
originating from malware which do not directly target SCADA will have a growing 
impact on those systems. 
 
b. Insider 
In years past, it was assumed that the only real threat to a control system 
was from a malicious internal employee.42  While this is certainly no longer the only 
threat, it is still a major concern.  Certainly, those that know the most about a system can 
cause the most damage.   
In addition to the malicious insider, the convergence of SCADA and IT 
products into the same technologies could allow employee misuse of resources.  Laptops 
carried across network barriers have facilitated the spread of malware into production 
systems.  Peer-to-peer networking and instant messaging services on SCADA control 
computers open them up to the vulnerabilities of those products.  Industrial control 




Experts that break into computer systems for the challenge and bragging 
rights provide an unintentional threat to a system.  Largely motivated by ego and 
curiosity, their illicit access to control systems could have significant consequences.                                                   
41 CERT, 4. 
42 Scott Berinato 
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Many hacking tools are known to cause problems with legacy SCADA systems; their use 
could cause significant damage.43  Additionally, no system administrator or control 
engineer would want someone using their network with mixed motivations. 
 
d. Terrorists 
The potential to cause significant damage in lives and property through 
industrial sabotage has focused attention on SCADA system security.  While there are no 
known events involving the deliberate destruction of critical infrastructure by terrorists 
with a cyber attack, this possibility is recognized by all.44  Insurgent groups in Iraq 
routinely sabotage oil production facilities using conventional means.  It is evident that 
they would use a cyber attack if that were available to them.  For instance, it is widely 
known that terrorist cells train with these systems and would like to use them to further 
their cause.45  The motivation certainly exists for terrorists to attack SCADA and this 
threat must be addressed. 
 
e. Industrial Sabotage and Espionage 
The economic damage caused by malfunctioning SCADA systems can be 
significant.  Honest mistakes can be highly detrimental to businesses, while malicious 
attacks might be devastating.46  Certainly, competitors can reap benefits from deliberate 
sabotage or even information gathering.  Manufacturing data is often confidential and 
could be targeted. 
 
f. Nation States 
The benefits of taking control of critical infrastructure from an enemy 
cannot be ignored by any military.  One of the primary aims of strategic air power is the 
reduction of essential resources such as power and transportation.  These resources are 
                                                 
43 Eric Byres (March 2003) 
44 HSPD7 
45 Hildick-Smith, 6. 
46 InTech (June 2006) 
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now largely controlled by SCADA systems.  By denying the use of those systems to the 
enemy at a critical time, military objectives can be achieved.  Computer network 
operations directed against control systems could have the benefit of leaving the physical 
infrastructure intact.  So, in addition to potentially keeping military personnel out of 
harms way, remote cyber assault might maintain the value of the asset for future use.  
Nation states have the resources, expertise, and motive to threaten SCADA systems. 
 
6. Mitigation Methods 
Mitigation techniques are used to reduce the amount of risk a system might have 
developed because of its vulnerabilities and the threats against it.  Educational initiatives, 
secure protocols, and security tools are all ways to reduce risk in control systems. 
 
a. Education 
Improving SCADA security education is a major initiative for the control 
system community.  Creating industry-wide awareness programs in the short term and 
developing long term security curricula are major milestones for improving the general 
state of secure process control.47  Security reviews of major SCADA systems 
demonstrate that “security training is essential to an effectual staff but is neglected for 
cost or other reasons.”48  Efforts are underway within the information technology security 
industry to improve awareness.  For example, a leading information system security 
industry education group, the SANS Institute, offers free educational web-casts and 
organizes SCADA-specific sessions as a part of their typical IT security training.49  
Additionally, the ISA has developed web-based security seminars and classroom training 
over the past 18 months targeted at the control system professional. 
 
 
                                                 
47 Eisenhauer. 
48 Stamp, 7. 
49 SANS has produced four SCADA security web-casts in 2006, compared to one in 2005.  It is also 
organizing the “The 2006 Process Control and SCADA Security Summit” along with the Department of 
Energy and Department of Homeland Security. 
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b. Secure Protocols 
Improving the intrinsic security of control network communications is an 
important future goal.  There are several SCADA-related groups working on this task.  
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ISA, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are a few of 
the organizations developing new protocols.50  Unfortunately, there is concern that the 
large number of entities involved is attenuating efforts by duplicating tasks and diluting 
funds.51 
 
c. Security Controls 
There are many existing techniques for reducing risk on an information 
network.  Most require only standard information security practices.52 
• Security Policies – Well determined security policies keep 
insecure practices from developing, disallow the use of 
unnecessary and vulnerable services, increase management 
awareness and enforcement, and improve user, management, and 
technical support understanding of security needs and necessity. 
• Secure Network Architectures – Physically or virtually isolating 
the control system network from other business systems contains 
problems, limits access, and reduces complexity.  This includes 
using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) for remote access across 
public networks and control system demilitarized zones (DMZs) 
for bridging between the enterprise and SCADA networks. 
• Firewalls and NIDS – Firewalls control network traffic and NIDS 
detect unauthorized behavior. 
                                                 
50 Government Accounting Office (March 2004), 27-39. 
51 Rolf E. Carlson et al., 19. 
52 Eric Byres et al. (January 2006). 
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• Anti-Virus – Anti-virus software stops the spread of known 
attacks from getting into the SCADA network.   
• Penetration Testing/Policy Review – Periodic technical and 
managerial reviews determine the effectiveness of the security 
controls. 
• Vulnerability Discovery – Network scanning finds existing 
vulnerabilities and rogue devices. 
• Defense in Depth – Put the right technologies, tools, and people at 
the most effective point to ensure the best possible amelioration of 
vulnerabilities.  
 
B. NETWORK RECONNAISSANCE 
This thesis focuses on the use of network reconnaissance as a form of 
vulnerability discovery.  It can be used to determine insecure network architectures, 
discover improperly configured firewalls and NIDS, execute penetration testing, and 
uncover unknown vulnerabilities.  At this time, there is little technical knowledge 
contained within the typical IT security tools.53  
Reconnaissance techniques can be used in this manner as constructive system 
auditing tools.  They can also be used as a precursor to attack.  Additionally, they can be 
used to understand how reconnaissance techniques could be used by an attacker.  The 
intent of this thesis is to explore SCADA reconnaissance as an auditing tool, although the 
information gathered could be useful for the other purposes. 
Network reconnaissance is the remote gathering of information about a computer 
network.  It is an investigation into the layout, equipment, and security measures on a 
network.  Reconnaissance is used to find vulnerabilities that a network might have by 
demonstrating how the network presents itself to an external entity.  It is an essential tool 
for network managers enabling them to monitor network status and find vulnerabilities.54 
                                                 
53 Krutz, 96-97. 
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Normal TCP sessions include 
a three-step set up and tear 
down, allowing both parties to 
fully acknowledge the 
communication events. 
 
Half-Open probes do not 
complete the three step 
handshake.  Thus, the 
existence of a network device 
is revealed, but no 
conversation is completed.  
Fin probes accomplish the 
same feat in a different 




Table 1.   Examples of Vendor Differences in TCP/IP Implementation.55 
 
Network reconnaissance can be performed using many different tools and 
techniques.  The general methods are divided into two categories, active and passive, 
determined by how much the exploration impacts normal network traffic (See Figure 3).  
Passive techniques listen to the traffic generated by nodes on the network and recognize 
identifiable patterns within the communications but do not reveal this monitoring to the 
other devices.  Unlike active techniques, passive reconnaissance methods should not 
provoke any responses from the other nodes because they are only listening.  Active 
probing can be further classified into typical and abnormal stimulus, depending on 
characteristics of the traffic used to identify components.  In these two situations, an 
unknown network node’s response to this communication is matched against libraries of 
known device responses (See Figure 4 and Table 1 for examples of active reconnaissance 
and how a device might be recognized by its response characteristics).  
All types of reconnaissance work by accepting input in the form of network traffic 
and comparing it against expected patterns.  Active and passive tools can be used to find 
vulnerable systems that can then be exploited.  There is a plethora of commercial and 
open-source tools available which accomplish active and passive recon such as: Ping, 
Traceroute, Nmap, Amap, p0f, Ethereal, Snort, Nessis and so on.  A review of these tools 
                                                 
55 After J.D. Fulp. 
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indicates there is not a little SCADA specialization.56  Fortunately, several do provide a 




                                                 
56 Eisenhauer, A-10.  Included as a “near-term” funding requirement in the “Security Tools and 
Practices: Tools and Models” matrix. 
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III. SCADA SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND FINGERPRINTING 
I propose four methods for remotely gathering information about control systems.  
The first uses a manufacturer-specific label within Ethernet frames to identify hardware.  
The second uses protocol-specific identifiers within TCP/UDP segments to identify 
applications.  The next recognizes specific responses within network payloads that are 
unique to control systems.  The final way attempts to use all of the information gathered 
about an unknown network node to match it to similar features of known SCADA 
devices. 
With any method of recognition, characteristics of an entity are compared against 
expected values to confirm identification.  When we recognize another person, we 
compare what our senses are telling us with our memory.  If our recollection of their face, 
voice, mannerisms, and shared experiences match to within a degree of error, we are 
confident that we have identified them correctly.  Similarly, if a password used during a 
log-on session matches the stored value, a computer will believe that it identified that 
user.   
In network reconnaissance, the information gathered about a device must be 
compared against a library of expected values.  Much of the value of a network 
reconnaissance system is contained in that recognition correlation database.  For 
example, it is not very useful to be able to only identify two persons.  Likewise, there 
needs to be confidence that the characteristics chosen will correctly identify the item.  If 
the characteristics are too general or mistaken, recognition will be less useful.  For 
example, being able to identify the difference between a man and woman is not as useful 
as recognizing a tall man with dark hair, blue eyes, a low pitched voice, and a size 12 
shoe.  Additionally, if it is thought that the man has size 12 shoes when he actually has 
size 9, the confidence in identification is decreased.  Thus, quantity and quality of the 
expected values are keys to a successful recognition system. 
The quantity and quality of the recognition database used in this thesis is subject 
to constraints.  It was infeasible to gather identifying characteristics of every possible 
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control system device.  Experimental data was limited to the devices on hand for 
exploration.  Identifying characteristics of devices and protocols not available for direct 
observation were deduced from research in open literature.  This information is more 
suspect than that confirmed by laboratory results.  Additionally, field conditions might 
create unexpected differences in behavior from the lab. 
Just as people use a multitude of identifying features to determine if they know 
someone, multiple network characteristics will help confirm SCADA devices.  Each of 
the general methods of recognition explored in this thesis is detailed below. 
 
A. MAC ADDRESS IDENTIFICATION 
A Media Access Control (MAC) address is used to uniquely identify nodes on an 
Ethernet network.  In the most widely used standard today, IEEE 802.3, MAC addresses 
are 48-bit numbers that identify the source and destination of an Ethernet data frame.  
With the 48-bit structure there are potentially 248, or almost 300,000,000,000,000, 
different addresses available for use.  They are typically represented in a hexadecimal 
format such as “00:C0:52:00:4D:38”.  The number system is managed by the IEEE as 
part of the standard, so they determine how the numbers are used and by whom.   
 
Figure 5.   IEEE 802.3 Ethernet Frame. 



















Details of Address 
0000 0000 1100 0000 0101 0010 
00:C0:52




OUI Prefix Device Unique Suffix 
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Every Ethernet network device is given its own MAC address to identify itself.  
Although it is designed in, it can be overwritten.57  Manufacturers are given an 
Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) to use by the IEEE.  The OUI consists of the 
first 6 hexadecimal numbers, or the prefix, in the MAC address.  Thus, “00:C0:52” is the 
OUI from the MAC above and it is assigned to the company Burr-Brown for any 
Ethernet device they create.  This means that if the MAC address of a device is known, 
its manufacturer can probably be deduced. 
Companies such as Dell Computer and Cisco Systems produce millions of 
networking devices corresponding to millions of MAC addresses and they are used in 
millions of anonymous applications.  Thus knowledge that a device is made by Dell or 
Cisco will not identify it as being part of a SCADA application.  On the other hand, many 
manufacturers with OUIs registered with the IEEE only produce control systems.  For 
instance a major PLC manufacturer, Rockwell-Automation, has reserved the prefix 
“00:00:BC” for its Ethernet enabled equipment.  Recognition of these MAC prefixes can 
be an accurate indicator of control devices. 
 
B. TCP/UDP PORT NUMBER IDENTIFICATION 
While OUI correlation can be used to recognize vendor hardware, TCP/UDP port 
numbers can be used to recognize control system applications.  TCP and UDP are two of 
the most widely used methods of OSI layer 4 communication.58  These protocols are 
defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and are standards used throughout 
the Internet.59  Each of these protocols contains a 16-bit source and destination port 
identification number.  They are employed to indicate to a computer which application is  
 
 
                                                 
57 Applications such as arpspoof, part of the dsniff package (http://monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/), are 
adept at impersonating MAC addresses.  Additionally, modification of MAC address only takes a simple 
network interface reconfiguration command in the Linux operating system. 
58 While TCP and UDP are very different protocols, they share the same port assignment list.  
Therefore they are dealt with as equivalent as far as port number recognition.  From this point on, UDP will 
not be specifically addressed within the text. 
59 TCP is defined in Request For Comment 793, UDP is defined in Request For Comment 768. 
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to receive any communicated data and can be used to identify applications a server might 
be offering to clients.  Port numbers are typically represented by the decimal equivalent 
of the 16-bit address.   
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) maintains the database of 
applications and numbers.60  IANA sets aside certain ranges of numbers for specific tasks 
within the 216 = 65536 possible addresses.  Of particular interest are the “well known” 
ports below 1024, these are set aside for services that might be exposed to access from 
outside an organization.  Many firewalls only allow inbound connections to ports less 
than this.  For example, TCP port 22 is one of the well-known ports and it is used for 
communications by the Secure Shell application.  Oftentimes only abnormal network 
traffic can be used to search out ports higher than this from outside the firewall. 
 
 
Figure 6.   RFC 793 – TCP Header.61 
 
 
Table 2.   IANA TCP Port Number Ranges                                                  
60 The official list is maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers.  A list that includes 
unofficial usage is at http://www.graffiti.com/services (both accessed August 4, 2006). 
61 After http://www.sans.org/resources/tcpip.pdf (accessed August 4, 2006) 
16 Bits 





Reserved Flags Window 
Checksum Urgent Pointer 
16 Bits 
Classification Port Range Usage Privileges 
Well-Known 0-1023 Common services for external access System 
Registered 1024-49151 Services for internal access User 
Dynamic/Private 49152-65535 Client User 
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Much like OUIs, server applications should publicly register their port number so 
that clients know how to connect to them.  If it is not widely known what port an 
application responds to, clients that wish to use that application will not be able to 
connect.  Generally, legitimate system developers will ensure that the ports they use are 
registered and that information is kept up to date. 
Additionally, network devices must be consistent in the ports that they use.  For 
example, if a client wishes to communicate with a database server, it must connect with 
the same port every time instead of hunting around for it.  Therefore, server ports are not 
usually dynamic.  Even if a number is not officially registered, communications to a 
specific application server port will generally be the same.  For example, port 31337 is 
not officially registered but is often used by malicious hackers to set up illicit services on 
a computer.  Once an application port number is known, communications on that port is 
usually for that particular application. 
Control system communications software and hardware vendors want their 
devices to communicate correctly.  Usually, they provide the port numbers for their 
applications to the IANA registry.  Therefore, TCP port numbers can be used to 
recognize SCADA network communications.  For example, port 2222 is registered to 
Rockwell Software; they produce the software used to communicate with Allen-Bradley 
PLCs.62  Active scanning of a Rockwell-Automation SLC505 PLC demonstrates that it 
listens for connections on port 2222.  Passive analysis of network traffic between clients 
and the SLC505 also confirm that this port is the primary communications channel. 
Review of the IANA port list, vendor protocol documentation, and laboratory 
traffic analysis can uncover what ports SCADA systems use.  The use of those ports is 
usually highly consistent.  Therefore, recognition of TCP ports used in control system 
communications can be a reliable indicator. 
 
 
                                                 
62 Both Rockwell Software and Allen-Bradley are divisions of Rockwell-Automation.  
Rockwell-Automation will be used to refer to both Rockwell Software and Allen-Bradley throughout the 
rest of this document. 
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C. SERVICE INTERROGATION 
Service interrogation further investigates a port suspected as being control system 
related.  Once it is known that a SCADA application might be listening for a connection, 
reconnaissance tools can attach to the service, ask it for information and determine more 
about it from the response received.  This method takes advantage of the fact that 
network services want clients to connect.  They are often willing to give up considerable 
information about themselves if asked in the correct manner.  
 
Figure 7.   EDAS Service Interrogation. 
 
For many SCADA protocols, it is simply a matter of asking it to tell us about the 
device.  For example, the Intelligent Instrumentation software includes a remote 
command that asks with what version of EDAS it is communicating.  The format of this 
query can be injected in a reconnaissance probe and the response analyzed to determine 
Command 
SYS_INQUIRE_CMD = 0x05 78 0x00 00 00 00 
Sent Data Size 
0x00 00 00 00 
Transmit Buffer 
Size 





0x00 00 00 84 
Sent Data 
 Size 









Can have any value 
Details of Type Code 
Code Intelligent Instrumentation Model # 
0xED 10 EDAS-1001E 
0xED 20  EDAS-1002E 
0xED 30  EDAS-1025E-1 (2-Port) 
0xED 31  EDAS-1025E-2 (4-Port) 
0xED 21  EDAS-1031E (16-bit Multifunction Unit) 
Stimulus Segment Data 
Response Segment Data 
 33
more device information (see Figure 7).  The Ethernet/IP protocol includes similar 
commands that return host vendor and model numbers.  These can then be cross-
referenced to determine exactly what device is conversing. 
Because many SCADA installations and applications assume a trusted 
environment, little is done to obfuscate information.  These protocols are often designed 
for maximal utility.  With that assumption, it is sensible for the vendors to include such 
querying mechanisms into their implementations.  This trust can be leveraged to gather 
information through remote reconnaissance. 
 
D. EQUIPMENT PROFILING 
This technique uses multiple sources of information to determine if a device is 
SCADA related.  OUI, TCP ports, and service interrogation are all applied to form a 
profile for the investigated network node.  This profile is then compared against known 
control system device specifications.  This is very similar to the operating system 
detection techniques shown in Table 1.  Separate parameters about a device are collected 
and compared against a fingerprint database. 
While typical computers are almost limitlessly configurable, most SCADA 
systems are more restricted.  In order to recognize a specific device, the list of all 
available services from a port scan can be correlated to the services a device should have.  
More definitive information from service interrogation or OUI matching could be used to 
improve confidence in the derived result.  For example, the Rockwell-Automation 
SLC505 demonstrates three open ports when interrogated: 80, 2222, and 44818.  Of the 
nineteen products made by Rockwell-Automation that listen on port 44818, only five 
listen on port 2222.  Of those, only three listen on port 80 including the SLC505 main 
model, Rockwell-Automation product 1747-L55x.  Additionally, all three are PLC 
interfacing equipment, either integral to the controller (1747-L55x and 1785-LxxE) or 
directly attached (1785-ENET).  Therefore, it can be determined that if a network device 




Table 3.   Rockwell-Automation Product Port Usage63 
 
Additional information could be added to improve the reconnaissance results.  
Determination that a device responds to the EDAS service interrogation would give 
strong assurance as its type.  A database of recognizable characteristics could be 
developed and reconnaissance results applied to find matches.  While an application that 
accomplishes this is beyond the scope of this thesis, simple exercises like the one above 
demonstrates the utility of the technique. 
 
 
                                                 
63 After “Q96531481 - TCP ports used by Rockwell products” 
http://domino.automation.rockwell.com/applications/kb/RAKB.nsf/0/50a8cfee1979d36985256f240046000
5 (accessed September 21, 2006) 
Product Port 44818 Port 2222 Port 80 
1734-AENT x   
1747-L55x (SLC505) x x x 
1756-ENET x   
1756-ENBT x   
1756-EWEB x   
1761-NET-ENI x   
1763-L16x x   
1769-L35E x   
1785-ENET x x x 
1785-LxxE x x x 
1794-AENT x   
1788-ENBT x   
PowerFlex Drives x   
PowerMonitor 3000 x   
PanelView x   
RSLinx x x  
RSLinx Enterprise x   
INTERCHANGE x x  
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IV. RECONNAISSANCE TOOL DEVELOPMENT 
In this thesis, I propose the development of network reconnaissance tools that 
understand SCADA systems.  In doing so, a prototype tool, SCADAScan, was created for 
proof of concept.  This chapter details the purposes of that tool, design criteria, design 
decisions, and operational details. 
 
A. TOOL PURPOSE 
By definition, the purpose of a reconnaissance tool is to discover information.  
This tool is to focus on using active and passive traffic analysis to find control system 
devices on a network.  It is to explore the effectiveness of different reconnaissance 
techniques at recognizing these devices.  In doing so, it will provide useful direction in 
the development of more comprehensive applications.  Those applications will provide 
network awareness to security managers in order to better protect critical infrastructure. 
The need for active and passive analysis derives from their different strengths.  
Active reconnaissance is proactive in discovering vulnerabilities.  For example, security 
personnel can actively discover holes in firewall configurations and NIDS alerts.  By 
starting a database of active responses and triggers, this project begins to collect 
information about specific devices and protocols.  Another purpose for including an 
active component in the tool is to explore the specific difficulties that are encountered 
with running such scans on a SCADA network.  Once the problems are known, a tool can 
be developed to work around them. 
Passive reconnaissance features are needed to demonstrate their utility.  While 
active reconnaissance requires initiation, passive techniques can be more comprehensive 
as they are able to continuously monitor for security policy violations.  Additionally, 
passive reconnaissance has the advantage of not disrupting communications.  Thus, there 
is no worry of disabling any active control systems.  Finally, demonstrating passive 
discovery of SCADA is useful for exploring offensive network operations.   
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The final purpose of SCADAScan is to measure the utility of the different 
network exploration techniques to control systems.  Determining if, and how well, they 
can be recognized by MAC identification, port identification, service interrogation, and 
equipment profiling is important to making future tool design decisions. 
 
B. TOOL CRITERIA 
In addition to satisfying its purposes, SCADAScan has some other design criteria:  
• Based on existing projects – The need to be built out of components from 
other applications arises from the desire not to “reinvent the wheel.”  
Effective solutions already exist for active and passive reconnaissance.  
Leveraging their expertise takes advantage of their strengths and allows 
SCADAScan to focus on the control system element. 
• Easy to add more identification parameters – As there are thousands of 
SCADA devices and new ones are constantly being developed, the ability 
to easily add new devices and their identifying characteristics should be 
incorporated into the tool.  In other words, it needs to be easily 
expandable.  For this thesis, only two control system devices were fully 
tested.  Additional devices need to be profiled and added to the database 
for recognition.  Thus the application must accomplish this without 
requiring redesign or recompilation. 
• Do no harm – For security managers to use SCADAScan in a proactive 
environment, it must be non-destructive.  Any reconnaissance tool that 
could damage the equipment it is attempting to protect is useless.  Any 
potentiality for harm should be fully understood and rectified as the tool 
continues development. 
• Open-source – Finally, I suggest that the tool be open-source for the 
following reasons.  First, budgetary restrictions on development required 
the use of open-source tools as the basis for specialization.  Work derived 
from those tools is required to be open-source or fall under other licensing 
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restrictions.  Secondly, an open-source project encourages wider 
participation in development.  Interested entities are not required to 
purchase licensed software and can have open access to the source; 
therefore, they are more likely to make positive contributions to the 
project.   
 
C. TOOL METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
SCADAScan uses the following methodology for discovering control system 
devices remotely.  First, the user determines whether to use passive or active techniques 
for their session.  Next, a target network or set of hosts is selected.  The results of these 
two decisions are input to SCADAScan using the command-line directives.   
If an active scan is selected, Nmap is invoked and it scans the target using 
SCADAScan options and information files.  Nmap accomplishes MAC and port 
identification through its own mechanisms, using the SCADA data files to correlate OUIs 
with control system vendors and open ports with control system applications.  Once the 
ports are identified, Amap sends trigger data to those applications and attempts to 
recognize any returned information as specific to SCADA.  Any identified system is 
indicated in the output of Nmap and Amap.    
If a passive scan is selected, Snort is invoked.  It will monitor any 
communications that reach the reconnaissance workstation’s NIC for SCADA 
identifiable characteristics.  When such traffic is detected, alerts are generated detailing 
specifics.  The pattern matching rules contained with the Snort SCADA files accomplish 
port identification and service interrogation. 
The purposes and design criteria for the SCADAScan project led to several design 
choices.  These decisions are discussed as follows. 
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1. Development Environment 
A variant of the Linux operating system (Debian) was chosen as the development 
operating system for the project.64  This was done because of the popularity of Linux as a 
platform for open-source security tool development and cost considerations.  All of the 
applications that SCADAScan is derived from were originally developed on open-source 
Unix operating systems.  Additionally, developing using Linux did not necessitate the 
acquisition of propriety software for the project.  The major disadvantage of using Linux 
is that it is not the main platform for most SCADA systems or corporate information 
networks. 
The Perl programming language was selected as the development environment.  
Perl has several advantages that lent itself to this project.  First, it is primarily focused on 
scripting other processes.  That is, it is used by system administrators to run other 
programs and interface with the operating system.  Thus, Perl makes it easy for the 
developer to execute child programs from within a parent application and process their 
output.  As the SCADAScan project was conceived as using other applications to do most 
of the work, this aspect of Perl is desirable.  Secondly, Perl is very good at processing 
text.  It includes a very powerful syntax for creating regular expressions that allows easy 
text based data processing.  This was deemed advantageous within the project for parsing 
the output of the component tools and for handling response/fingerprint comparisons.  
Finally, there are many freely available Perl interpreters and development environments. 
Perl does have some significant drawbacks.  First it is an interpreted language, 
thus a Perl interpreter is required on any workstation that will run SCADAScan.  As such, 
it will probably execute slower and be more memory consumptive than a compiled 
language such as C.  From a project development standpoint, Perl also suffers by being a 
scripting language.  It does not require as much programming discipline as a language 
such a Java.  While this makes for easy initial creation, it lends to the creation of code 
where it is very difficult to discover what is happening.  For example, Perl allows for 
situations where a function’s return value is whatever calculation was performed last.  
                                                 
64 For simplicity sake, the differences between Unix, Linux, and their derivatives are not noted within 
this thesis. 
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This oftentimes makes it difficult to determine where a function is getting its return value 
from.  Sometimes large Perl applications become extremely difficult to follow and debug. 
 
2. Underlying Tools 
Three open-source network security tools were selected to act as the main engine 
for control system discovery: Nmap, Amap and Snort.  Nmap and Amap are used for 
active reconnaissance while Snort is used for passive data collection.65  SCADAScan 
leverages their development efforts in order to focus solely on the control system aspects 
of network discovery. 
 
a. Nmap 
We used Nmap to provide most of the active reconnaissance functionality.  
For the SCADAScan application, it accomplished initial host discovery followed by 
enumeration of any known SCADA TCP ports. 
Network map, or Nmap, is perhaps the most used reconnaissance tool in 
the security community.66  Many other applications incorporate it into their own suite of 
tools.  Nmap is primarily used for host and port discovery, finding devices at layers 2, 3 
and 4 of the OSI model.  It, or a derivative, is often the first tool used in active network 
reconnaissance. 
It was chosen for SCADAScan because it is a very mature, popular, and 
full featured application.  Nmap has significant documentation and support considering 
that it is an open-source project.  It is continuously improved; in fact, several significant 
enhancements were made to the base package during the course of this thesis.  This 
maturity and popularity make it likely that Nmap will continue to be a viable product for 
the foreseeable future.  Most importantly, Nmap has a large array of active scanning 
capabilities that can be leveraged by the prototype application. 
                                                 
65 Nmap was created by Fyodor, available from http://www.insecure.org/nmap.  Amap was created by 
van Hauser, available from http://thc.segfault.net/thc-amap.  Snort is available from http://www.snort.org 
(All accessed August 28, 2006) 
66 See reviews listed at http://insecure.org/nmap/nmap_inthenews.html (accessed August 15, 2006) 
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Perhaps the most significant drawback to Nmap is that it is able to create 
practically any type of network traffic, including data communications which might 
disable control systems.  Additionally, many of these more powerful scans require high 
level access (also called “root” or “administrator” access) to the system performing the 
scan.  This level of privilege can be problematic and might require significant 
modification to the SCADAScan tool in future development. 
SCADAScan uses Nmap to perform initial host and port discovery.  It 
accomplishes this by running the following Nmap command and parsing the results: 
 
nmap -F -v -n -oG nmap_results --datadir nmap_files {target} 
 
Here, “nmap” invokes that application.  The “-F” tells it to run a “Fast” 
scan, to only scan the ports that are indicated in the “nmap-services” file.  The “-v” 
indicates that “verbose” output is to be used, in other words Nmap will tell us more about 
what it is doing.  The “-n” is to never attempt to resolve DNS names, a procedure that 
does not give much additional information and could take considerable time.  The “-oG 
nmap_results” indicates to output the results of the scan to the file “nmap_results” in a 
format that is easily parsed.  The “--datadir nmap_files” directive forces Nmap to use the 
network information files contained in the “nmap_files” directory.  SCADAScan uses its 
own set of files instead of the defaults installed with Nmap.  Finally, a target is specified.  
This parameter is passed from the command line entry to SCADAScan.  It consists of a 
set or range of IP addresses to be reconnoitered.  Note that the specific type of port scan 
is not dictated to Nmap, therefore it will use a SYN scan if the executing user has system 
administrator privileges and a normal TCP connect scan if not. 
The “nmap_files” directory contains most of the useful information for 
identifying control systems using Nmap.  See Table 4 for a list of the files that it contains 
and what each of them details.  The contents of “nmap-mac-prefixes” and 
“nmap-services” are explained in Appendix A and B, respectively. 
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SCADAScan prints the results of the Nmap scan to the standard output 
(the console).  An array of host IP addresses and suspicious ports from the Nmap scan is 
generated by parsing the “nmap_results” file.  This array is then passed to Amap by the 
Perl script. 
 




We used Amap to provide service interrogation within the SCADAScan 
tool.  It took any SCADA ports found by Nmap and requested additional information to 




nmap-mac-prefixes List of OUIs and their registered organizations 
used by SCADAScan 
x 
nmap-mac-prefixes.nmap The original version of “nmap-mac-prefixes” 
installed with Nmap 
 
nmap-mac-prefixes.scada The version of “nmap-mac-prefixes” 
containing only SCADA relevant OUIs.  It 
should be the same as “nmap-mac-prefixes” 
unless the user has made changes. 
 
nmap-os-fingerprints The fingerprints used to identify operating 
systems.  This functionality is not used by 
SCADAScan. 
 
nmap-protocols List of IP protocols known to Nmap.  This 
functionality is not used by SCADAScan. 
 
nmap-rpc List of remote procedure call application 
identifiers.  This functionality is not used by 
SCADAScan. 
 
nmap-service-probes Service profiles for the Nmap application.  
This functionality is not used by SCADAScan. 
 
nmap-services List of TCP and UDP ports and their 
corresponding services used by SCADAScan. 
x 
nmap-services.nmap The original version of “nmap-services” 
installed with Nmap 
 
nmap-services.scada The version of “nmap-services” containing 
only SCADA ports, a level of confidence in 
the relevance to control systems is included.  
It should be the same as “nmap-services” 




Amap is a network reconnaissance tool developed to enumerate ports 
uncovered by Nmap for the purpose of gaining more information about an available 
service.  It is specifically targeted for situations where applications listen on a non-
standard port.  Thus, its default configuration will try all known service stimuli against all 
known ports. 
The two main advantages that this tool has are that it provides an existing 
engine for interrogation and that it was closely coupled to Nmap.  The syntaxes for 
generating service stimuli and response matching are simple to learn, requiring only 
knowledge of Perl regular expressions.   
It has two significant weaknesses.  First, Amap is not very well 
documented and the project is not supported to the degree that Nmap is.  The future of the 
Amap project seems in doubt because Nmap is subsuming its functionality.  Second, 
Amap assumes that a port given to it by Nmap does not have the registered application 
listening there.  By default, it iterates through all of the possible stimuli for all of the 
possible open connections on the server.  This can generate unnecessary traffic, is a dead 
give-away that reconnaissance is occurring, and can spark unexpected behavior by 
applications receiving stimulus they cannot handle.  Fortunately, methods are used within 
SCADAScan that force Amap to only use triggers for the expected application listening 
on a given port. 
Amap is executed after Nmap is finished enumerating hosts and ports at 
the target.  It runs a scan for each host identified, sending stimuli only to the ports defined 
as potentially having control system applications.  The following command is executed 
by SCADAScan: 
 
amap -A -D amap_files/scada -p {application} –R {target} {port} 2>&1 
 
Here “amap” invokes that application.  The “-A” indicates to run as the 
default application mapper instead of in some different mode of operation.  The “-D 
amap_files/scada” tells Amap to look in the “amap_files” directory for its data files, 
which all start with “scada.”  The “-p {application}”, where “{application}” is the name 
of an application trigger to be used in this run, indicates to use only that stimulus.  For 
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example, “-p edas” is used to run only the defined “edas” triggers against the target.  The 
“-R {target} {port}” indicates the IP address and port number which are the target of the 
scan.  Finally, “2>&1” is a shell command that tells the application to print out any error 
information to the standard output instead of to the standard error output.  This is required 
to fully view the Amap output through the Perl scripting engine. 
Amap produces three types of results for SCADAScan.  This output is all 
sent to stdout.  If the service interrogation produces matches, they are listed for the user.  
Every possible match is shown.  Thus, when the SLC505 web-service is probed, the 
returned information matches the profile of both a general Rockwell-Automation product 
and the SLC505 specific rule.  When data is not received from the port interrogated an 
error message is produced by Amap and passed through SCADAScan.  In the final 
situation, unmatchable information is received by Amap.  That program flags it as such 
and prints any received information in hexadecimal and ASCII format.  This final output 
is very useful for developing new recognition signatures as stimulus responses can be 
viewed for known devices in a laboratory. 
The SCADAScan configuration for Amap includes two custom files, 
“scada.trig” and “scada.resp”, located in the “amap_files” directory.  These consist of the 
triggers and responses for control system protocols that are identified in this thesis.  See 
Appendix C for details of the files, their format, and explanations of entries. 
 
 





appdefs.resp The original list of service responses to 
triggers installed with Amap. 
 
appdefs.rpc The original version responses for RPC 
interrogations installed with Nmap.  This 
functionality is not used with SCADAScan. 
 
appdefs.trig The original list of triggers for each service 
installed with Amap. 
 
scada.resp The SCADA protocol responses to triggers. x 
scada.trig The list of SCADA protocol triggers. x 
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c. Snort 
Snort provided passive reconnaissance functionality to the SCADAScan 
application.  A specific Snort configuration and identification rule set were added to 
determine control system network traffic. 
Like Nmap, Snort was chosen for the SCADAScan tool because it is a 
highly supported open-source application with a large user base.67  Additionally, it 
provides a significant number of configuration options that allow considerable 
customization without modifying the source code.  Snort’s two disadvantages from a 
software engineering standpoint are that it requires “root” privileges to run and contains 
significant overhead for what is required within SCADAScan. 
Snort requires considerable configuration to be used with the SCADAScan 
tool.  First, Snort starts execution at a high privilege level before dropping to a lower one 
during normal execution.  Second, Snort is typically halted by sending it a process 
interrupt.  Thus, SCADAScan is required to gracefully handle this input and pass it on to 
the Snort sub-process without shutting itself down.  The execution command for Snort 
uses the following syntax: 
 
snort –A console –c snort_files/snort.scada.conf 2>&1 
 
Here “snort” invokes the application and while the “-c 
snort_files/snort.scada.conf” directs it to use that file for its configuration settings.  The 
“-A console” directs any output from Snort to the standard console instead of the log file 
system that is normally tasked for this.  This allows all output from Snort to be handled 
by SCADAScan, which is used so that information can be both logged to file and printed 
on the command line. 
Most of the configuration directives for Snort are contained within the 
configuration files.  This includes all of the rules used to analyze network traffic for 
SCADA characteristics.  This information is detailed in Appendix E; see Table 6 for a list 
of the Snort configuration files modified for the project.  For SCADAScan, Snort is 
                                                 
67 According to www.snort.org, “Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion detection and prevention 
technology worldwide and has become the de facto standard for the industry.” 
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configured to find all of the relevant rules, threshold, classification, and reference files 
and execute as a specific user after initialization. 
 
 
Table 6.   Snort Configuration Files 
 
3. SCADAScan 
SCADAScan is a Perl script meant to be executed from a command-line interface.  
It is structured in five simple modules along functionality lines.  There is a main module 
which initiates the program and executes the sub-process applications.  There is a 
separate module for execution of each of the sub-processes: Nmap, Amap, and Snort.  
Finally, there is a module used to interpret command-line directives to SCADAScan. 
A user executes the main script and passes it running parameters.  In addition to 
some standard options, users can execute the underlying applications directly and indicate 
what type of reconnaissance to perform.  If tasked to execute active reconnaissance, 





classification.config Used to define rule classifications.  This is the 
original file installed with Snort. 
 
classification.scada.config The classifications used with SCADAScan. X 
threshold.conf Used to define rule thresholds and 
suppression.  This is the original. 
 
threshold.scada.config The thresholds and suppression rules for 
SCADAScan.  None are defined here. 
X 
rules.scada The list of the rules defining detection of 
SCADA protocols and devices. 
X 
reference.config Used to define references used throughout 
the other configuration files.  This is the 
original. 
 
reference.scada.config SCADAScan’s version, although currently 
there are no changes. 
X 
snort.conf Used to give configuration directives to Snort.  
This is the original. 
 
snort.scada.conf The SCADAScan specific configuration. X 
 
 46
execute passive reconnaissance, Snort is invoked.  Output from the sub-processes is 




V. RECONNAISSANCE RESULTS 
In this section, I discuss the results that were encountered while developing and 
using the SCADAScan tool.  First, I cover the strengths, weaknesses, and 
experimentation results for each of the four reconnaissance techniques previously 
discussed: MAC identification, port identification, service interrogation, and equipment 
profiling.  Finally, I analyze our experience of tying all these techniques together into a 
single tool. 
 
A. MAC ADDRESS IDENTIFICATION RESULTS 
Identification of OUI demonstrated promise but turned out to be limited in scope.  
While there will be good applications for MAC recognition, it will probably not be the 
focus of any future tool. 
 
1. Strengths of MAC Identification 
The major strength of this technique is that certain devices can be definitively 
shown to be part of a control system.  When a manufacturer only makes control systems, 
the fact that an Ethernet address is attributable to them is positive verification. 
Anther advantage that MAC recognition has is that the prefixes are well known 
and publicly available.  The database of OUIs is maintained by the IEEE and can be 
referenced via the Internet.68  Although OUIs can be masked and overwritten in practice, 
the base OUIs cannot be changed once manufactured into a piece of Ethernet hardware.  
In practice, it is unlikely that the identifying information will be masked as using the 
original OUI is typically default behavior. 
 
2. Problems of MAC Identification 
Although they can be useful, OUIs do have many major drawbacks.  Specifically, 
they are only exposed to reconnaissance within an Ethernet network on which the device 
                                                 
68 “IEEE OUI and Company_id Assignments” http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/index.shtml 
(accessed September 21, 2006) 
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resides, SCADA manufacturers might use components from another company, many 
control system producers do not only make control systems, MACs can be overwritten, 
and the IEEE database does not have significant quality control. 
As data traverses the Internet, the Ethernet address is only used for 
communications within a local area network.  The moment data requires routing to a 
different subnet, MAC addresses are replaced.  If reconnaissance is performed from 
different networks than the one that the control device is on, the MAC address of the 
originating device is never received.  Thus, MAC identification is only useful for 
exploration within a local network.  This condition only applies to communications using 
the IPv4 protocol.  It might be possible to remotely determine OUIs if IPv6 is used.69 
Another drawback is that manufacturers often buy components of their systems 
from other companies.  The Ethernet components of a SCADA device might be 
registered to a company that makes components for a variety of different industries.  For 
instance, the EDAS device used in testing was manufactured by Intelligent 
Instrumentation, but its OUI is registered to Burr-Brown.  That company produces 
communications products for use in many industries, not just for control systems. 
As mentioned before, the OUI is only useful if the registered company produces 
control system products exclusively.  Recognizing a Dell OUI is not useful for 
identifying a node as SCADA related.  MACs can also be changed and the OUI 
overwritten.  Thus, any identification using it can be fooled.  For instance, the EDAS 
device has a utility that allows an arbitrary MAC to be written to it.  The prefix can be 
zeroed or a different OUI forged and recognition thwarted. 
Finally, the public library of MAC prefixes contains errors.  It is simple to request 
an OUI from the IEEE.  The seven day application processing time quoted by the IEEE 
makes it doubtful that there is any significant authentication of applicants.  Additionally, 
companies change, they are bought, sold, or go out of business.  The OUI registration 
might be out of date.  A device’s OUI could be from a company that owned the number 
in the past but does not now.  For example, the OUI registered to Burr-Brown above is 
                                                 
69 The IP protocol has an update, IPv6, while IPv4 is the most commonly used version. 
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actually owned by Texas Instruments because the two companies merged.  There seems 
to be little enforcement of registrations, any company can use another’s OUI if they 
wanted. 
Because of these drawbacks, the utility of MAC prefix identification is limited.  It 
can provide definitive information in certain situations, but should not be the main 
element in a SCADA reconnaissance system. 
 
3. Research Results 
Research was conducted using the IEEE OUI library to determine if a MAC 
address could be used to identify a control system device.  A recent version of the 
database was acquired.  That information was reduced and modified for use as input to 
the experimental reconnaissance application.  This was then used to actively identify a 
control system device.   
Individual company entries were reviewed to see if they might indicate a SCADA 
device.  This was determined using three methods.  First, experimental experience with 
that company or specific device was used.  Second, control system vendor names in the 
OUI database were cross-referenced with a list of vendors that are identified as using the 
Ethernet/IP SCADA protocol.  That protocol is used exclusively for industrial control 
data communications.  Vendors are required to register an identification code with the 
protocol’s industry group.  The list of vendors is publicly available.70  Thus, these known 
SCADA companies could be cross-referenced with the OUI database.  Finally, corporate 
websites and other forms of Internet research were used to confirm the relevance of the 
OUI to control system reconnaissance.  I assigned a subjective level of confidence to the 
information gathered. 
All of this research information was combined into an input file for the SCADA 
reconnaissance research tool.  See Appendix A for a full list of identified MAC prefixes; 
over 140 OUIs were recognized with a potential tie to control systems.  The tool was 
used in the lab and the Rockwell-Automation SLC505 PLC was identified by its OUI.  
                                                 
70 Available from “EtherNet/IP Vendor IDs” http://www.odva.org/10_2/03_events/New-
EtherNet/EtherNetIP_VendorIDs.zip (accessed September 21, 2006), see Appendix A 
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As expected, other control system devices with less recognizable prefixes were not 
discovered as such via this technique.  Also as anticipated, attempts to discover SCADA 
nodes across a network boundary were unsuccessful. 
 
B. PORT IDENTIFICATION RESULTS 
Port identification holds the most promise as an initial control network discovery 
tool.  Conversely, problems with unexpected reactions by control system devices to the 
active stimulus need to be fully explored. 
 
1. Strengths of Port Identification 
Port identification has some significant advantages.  First, it is simple to discover 
which port number a control system protocol uses.  Second, the numbers are usually 
maintained from end-point to end-point.  Next, some port identification methods can 
circumvent network perimeter security devices.  Finally, the numbers are typically not 
encrypted even if the segment payload might be. 
It is usually not difficult to ascertain the port number that a control systems uses.  
Review of the public IANA database reveals that several well-known SCADA 
applications have registered ports.  For example, Device Control Protocol has reserved 
port 93.  Additionally, analysis of openly available documentation for 
Rockwell-Automation products finds that they use port 44818 in addition to 2222.71  
Network traffic captures and port scans can quickly identify a TCP port.  Thus, it was 
easily discovered that the Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS listened on port 5891.  
Network communication TCP port numbers are usually very overt; recognizing SCADA 
protocols from one is just a matter of knowing that it is used by the protocol. 
Perhaps the biggest strength of port identification is that the numbers are usually 
maintained during transmission from host to host.  Unlike with MAC prefix recognition, 
port numbers typically cross network barriers.  Ports are used by the host to direct 
communications to specific applications.  Thus, they are required at the host level and are 
                                                 
71 A simple search on the Rockwell Automation knowledge base website produces article 
“Q96531481 - TCP ports used by Rockwell products,” (accessed August 7, 2006). 
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not usually modified in route.  Reconnaissance at any point between the two 
communicating hosts can uncover usage. 
Abnormal traffic reconnaissance techniques can be employed effectively for port 
identification.  Using unusual TCP segment structures and data can circumvent some 
firewalls and NIDS detection.72  In this situation, those protections believe that the 
atypical probes are innocuous and allow them to proceed around any filtering.  For 
example, a firewall might be configured to block all incoming traffic to port 2222 and 
also to ignore any segment with the “Reset” flag set.  An active reconnaissance 
application could send a probe to port 2222 with that flag set so that the firewall ignores 
it.  Then, a response might be returned indicating that the port is actually available 
instead of blocked.  Here the attempt to obfuscate the existence of a control system 
application was circumvented by the unusual TCP settings. 
A final advantage is that TCP header information is not usually encrypted.  This 
means that the port number is not hidden from inspection.  Even if a control system 
communications protocol encrypts the payload information, the fact that it is using a 
specific port gives away its nature.   
While MAC prefix identification may demonstrate the use of specific hardware, 
port number analysis may demonstrate the use of specific software.  Unless the SCADA 
network traffic is tunneled inside of a virtual private network or over a channel used by 
many applications, port recognition will likely reveal its existence. 
 
2. Weaknesses of Port Identification 
While recognizing ports might be more useful than identifying OUIs, there are 
some drawbacks to this method.  It cannot recognize hardware as easily as MAC 
matching.  The database of numbers suffers from the same problems as the one for OUIs.  
Multiple applications might use the same port number.  Ports, like MACs, can be 
spoofed.  Blindly searching for ports can have unintended consequences.  Finally, 
network filtering and monitoring can identify and block port reconnaissance. 
                                                 
72 Many interesting network reconnaissance techniques using abnormal network traffic are discussed 
in the Nmap documentation at http://insecure.org/nmap/nmap_doc.html (accessed August 8, 2006). 
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While MAC numbers are associated with hardware, TCP ports are associated with 
software.  As such, multiple hardware devices might operate the same software.  
Therefore, port reconnaissance might determine that a particular SCADA application is in 
use, but be unable to tell what piece of equipment is using it.  For example, port 2222 and 
44818 can be found on devices using Rockwell-Automation products.  In the lab, those 
ports are found on the Rockwell-Automation SLC505 and on the Dell workstation with 
an HMI application.  More information is needed to determine which device is which.  
Additionally, even though a port number might indicate a SCADA protocol, there might 
be multiple implementations.  While port 502 is used with the control system 
communications standard Modbus/TCP, there are many implementations of this 
protocol.73  Fortunately, control system protocols tend to be vendor specific. 
Like the OUI database, the official port number records are not well maintained.  
Many ports are in use by multiple vendors, others are have confusing descriptions, and 
application developers often do not bother to register their systems.  For example, the 
reputable control system software company Rockwell Automation uses TCP port 400 for 
its RSSql product.  According to IANA, it is registered to an organization called 
Workstations Solutions for an application dubbed “work-sol.”  In another case, IANA 
calls the application corresponding to port 502 “asa-appl-proto.”  The only clue that this 
is the port for the popular SCADA protocol Modbus/TCP is that it is registered to its 
original developers, Modicon.  A final example is that the EDAS unit listening port of 
5891 has no record in the IANA database.  While the official registry is a good place to 
start corresponding port numbers to SCADA applications, experimental experience is the 
best method to confirm it. 
Perhaps a more significant drawback to recognizing ports is when several 
common applications use the same port or have a port dynamically allocated.  For 
example, many SCADA devices listen on port 80 which is indicative of any HTTP 
(web-based) application.  Very little information is gained in knowing about port 80 due 
to the massive number of web-based applications on the Internet.  Secondly, some control 
                                                 
73 Go to http://www.modbus.org/toolkit.php for instructions on making a custom Modbus/TCP 
implementation (accessed August 7, 2006). 
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system applications are carried by more ubiquitous protocols over their ports.  For 
instance, the Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control (OPC) standard uses the 
more common Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) technology from 
Microsoft.  In this case, OPC through DCOM initially establishes communications on 
port 135, but then the connection is moved to a dynamically allocated number.  Having 
many applications use the same port or having different ones for different conversations 
makes port identification less useful. 
While TCP port numbers are usually maintained during the transit of information 
from host to host, it is not absolutely certain that it will be.  Port numbers can be spoofed 
by other applications and they can be translated by network traffic control devices.  For 
example, Nmap can be told to use a specific port so communications from it could be 
construed as originating from a SCADA device.  Port forwarding is a common technique 
used to obfuscate services on a network.  Here, the registered port number is translated to 
an unusual one.  A firewall or other network device keeps track of the change and 
dynamically redirects traffic.  
Another weakness to using port recognition stems from some active 
reconnaissance techniques.  As shown above, active exploration tools such as Nmap can 
use unusual TCP segment data to try and find available ports.  Additionally, they can 
open many connections with a device but then not close them gracefully.  Unfortunately, 
some hardware devices do not handle the unexpected information or consumption of 
resources well.74  This behavior could cause significant problems in an operational 
control system environment.  All network reconnaissance tools should be tested against 
expected hardware in a lab before use in the field. 
As explained before, network traffic on specific port number is easily monitored.  
While network reconnaissance takes advantage of this fact, so can network intrusion 
detection systems and firewalls.  Probes from tools like Nmap can be detected by tools 
such as Snort.  Port exploration, especially on specific numbers, is generally detectable.  
                                                 
74 Warnings concerning this phenomenon are in the Nmap documentation or at 
http://insecure.org/nmap/man/man-port-scanning-techniques.html (accessed August 8, 2006) and were 
observed during experimentation with SCADAScan. 
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With the knowledge that this research attempts to collect, network perimeter security 
tools should be able to counter unwanted port information collection. 
 
3. Research Results 
Research was gathered from various sources to identify the TCP/UDP ports 
commonly used by control systems network communications.  This was then verified in 
lab tests for selected data.  Then the information was collated and placed into an input file 
for use with SCADAScan. 
Information about port number registrations was gathered from three main 
sources: the IANA registry, vendor documentation, and experimental discovery.  Entries 
in the official port database were reviewed for control system relevance by 
cross-referencing with the OUI list, Internet searches, and experience.  Industry manuals 
covering network communications with Modbus/TCP and Rockwell Automation 
products were inspected.75  Laboratory experiments confirmed some of the ports used by 
Rockwell Automation and Intelligent Instrumentation.   
SCADAScan assigns a subjective confidence level to the correspondence between 
port and application.  A high value indicates a preponderance of data and experimental 
confirmation of usage.  A medium value indicates vendor or industry documentation of 
usage.  A low value indicates recognition of the protocol or registering entity as control 
system related. 
All of this information was collated and placed in a structured format for use with 
SCADAScan.  Appendix B contains a printout of the final data, 87 separate SCADA 
services were found to have identifiable port numbers.  SCADAScan used this file to 





                                                 
75 Modbus-IDA and Rockwell-Automation (2006). 
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C. SERVICE INTERROGATION RESULTS 
If service interrogation can be combined with port identification, very accurate 
results can be achieved.  While it requires considerable effort to create good stimuli, the 
information gathered will be significant. 
 
1. Strengths of Service Interrogation 
Service interrogation’s strengths lie in using a network service’s need to 
communicate against it.  This allows for truthful and reliable information gathering. 
This form of reconnaissance is probably the most accurate.  Unless the application 
is modified to mislead such queries, precise information is gleaned.  As far as the 
protocol is concerned, a properly formatted reconnaissance probe is a valid request for 
data.   
In addition to being accurate, service interrogation should be highly available.  
Again, the network service needs to avail itself to client connections to be useful.  
Therefore, it should respond to valid requests for information.  On the other hand, 
network perimeter defenses should be configured to block any illicit communication even 
with a normal format.  There may be no way to circumvent such protections and still 
allow this overt channel. 
 
2. Weaknesses of Service Interrogation 
While this reconnaissance technique is very useful, it does have some drawbacks.  
It suffers from the same potentiality for destructive behavior that port identification does.  
If unexpected data is sent to the wrong port, it might cause application faults.  That said 
service interrogation should be less disruptive than port recognition techniques.  It does 
attempt to send properly formatted data to specific ports instead of blindly sending out 
packets.  Still, all service interrogation triggers should be tested in a lab environment 
before being used on production systems. 
Service interrogation requires significant research.  Every application to be 
stimulated needs to be well understood in order to properly structure the trigger data and 
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correctly interpret the responses.  For example, most port recognition research can be 
gathered by spending a few hours searching the Internet or monitoring known 
communications.  Service interrogation requires days of protocol analysis: first 
researching any documentation, then confirming behavior in the lab, and finally crafting 
the necessary network probe information.  It might not be feasible to correctly analyze 
some protocols due to complexity, lack of utility, or a dearth of documentation.  For 
example, a control protocol might require multiple TCP conversations in order to gather 
system information.  While it is possible to recreate such communications, it is probably 
not feasible within a relatively simple network reconnaissance tool. 
 
3. Research Results 
In the scope of this effort, this technique was applied to two control system 
services.  The protocols for communicating between custom workstation applications and 
the Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS unit were analyzed along with the format of a web 
request to a Rockwell-Automation SLC505.  System documentation and sample code was 
reviewed for information.  A network stimulus was crafted and a set of expected 
responses determined.  These were packaged into the lab reconnaissance tool and tests 
were conducted. 
The protocol used to communicate with an EDAS unit was selected due to the 
availability of documentation and equipment.  EDAS units are used in small 
manufacturing control systems as RTUs or data acquisition devices.  They contain no 
process control logic, requiring custom applications to accomplish that aspect of 
SCADA.  Intelligent Instrumentation provides significant programming interface and 
system documentation.76  Additionally, they distribute source code for communicating 
with the devices.  Review of the documentation and some network packet captures 
revealed that there was an inquiry command for determining device type.  Continued 
analysis of the network traffic and careful review of the source code determined the exact 
structure of this communication. 
                                                 
76 Information about the EDAS 1000 series of devices, documentation, and source code are all 
available at http://www.instrument.com (accessed August 9, 2006). 
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While researching network communications with the SLC505 it was found that 
the embedded web-services on the device generated identifying information.  A standard 
query for the default web page on the server returned the type of web server 
(Allen-Bradley) and the type of device (1747-L551, the SLC505 part number).  As this 
default information is embedded with the device, it is expected to be consistent with other 
SLC505s.  Thus, a standard HTTP Get query was matched with the expected return data 
to form a fingerprint for this device. 
The pertinent information was crafted into the reconnaissance system.  For the 
EDAS, a stimulus was crafted in order to execute the inquiry command without the 
management overhead of the full system.  Expected signatures were developed for the 
five types of EDAS units the stimulus should recognize.  The existing HTTP stimulus 
was used for the SLC505 and expected signatures were designed.   
This information was formatted for the experimental application and several tests 
were executed.  The stimulus correctly identified the EDAS-1025 and correctly rejected 
other applications set to listen on the same ports.  The SLC505 was also identified and 
other web servers ignored.  A graphical representation of the EDAS interrogation is 
shown earlier in Figure 7; see Appendix C for details of the stimulus and response files 
used with SCADAScan. 
 
D. EQUIPMENT PROFILING RESULTS 
Profiling was not executed formally within the SCADAScan tool.  Still, initial 
investigation indicates promise.  It has the advantages of combining techniques and 
developing probabilistic results when definitive information is unavailable. 
  
1. Strengths of Profiling 
This technique has three strengths: information is gathered from multiple inputs, it 
can have a probabilistic format, and it can develop accurate device information.  By 
receiving data from more than one technique, it can take the strengths of both.  For 
example, it can use firewall avoidance techniques from port scanning to find hidden 
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services which might then be susceptible to service interrogation.  Secondly, in situations 
where definitive information could not be gathered, equipment profiling can provide the 
probability of a match.  Using the earlier profiling example, after gathering all of the port 
information we can determine that there is a 33% chance the device is a SLC505.  This is 
a much better likelihood than the 5.6% when it is only known that port 44818 is 
available.  Finally, port identification and service interrogation usually only provide 
application information, while the example above shows equipment profiling is more 
likely to produce device specific information. 
 
2. Weaknesses of Profiling 
There are two weaknesses to this approach.  First, it requires the most research 
effort of all the techniques.  Second, it is a more programmatically complex problem than 
could be covered within this thesis.  Such a system would require developing a 
customized equipment recognition algorithm to sort through the fingerprint database.  
While similar such systems exist (notably within Nmap), none were found that could be 
readily used here. 
The Nmap operating system (OS) fingerprinting engine was reviewed for 
applicability to control system reconnaissance.  Unfortunately, it is focused on collecting 
data from implementations of the TCP/IP protocols.  While this is excellent at identifying 
the underlying system that manages network communications, it was found to be not as 
useful in identifying SCADA equipment.  In particular, an OS determination was 
executed against the Rockwell-Automation SLC505.  It successfully determined that the 
communications subsystem of that device used NetBSD.  That OS is commonly 
embedded in other systems to provide communications and other services.  Thus, 
knowing that particular OS is present does not help to identify that it is a control system 






E. SCADASCAN DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION RESULTS 
While many of the concepts and design decisions of the SCADAScan tool worked 
well, problems did arise.  The purpose of the tool was met and three of the other design 
criteria were satisfied.  As expected, the Perl script was able to quickly pull together the 
three existing tools into a single package and parse their output.  It was a simple matter of 
editing a few files to add new control system device recognition characteristics into the 
underlying tools.  The open-source requirement was met by using only open-source tools 
as the building blocks.  Finally, experimental results showed that was able to achieve the 
major design purpose of passively and actively discovering SCADA devices.   
Unfortunately, some design problems were discovered.  First off, it failed to “not 
disrupt control system operation”.  In other words, the tool was not transparent to the 
control system.  The unprivileged active scanning by Nmap did adversely affect some of 
the devices in the lab.  At first, the development process attempted to create a tool that 
would not require privileged access to the reconnaissance workstation.  That failed as 
Snort required initialization as “root” and Nmap privileged scans turned out to be less 
disruptive to the devices than the unprivileged ones.  While the exact active scanning 
problem experienced needs to be determined, it is safest to run SCADAScan as root.  For 
example, twenty privileged scans were run against one of the devices in the lab with no 
problems.  Conversely, unprivileged scans caused a device failure seven out of ten times.  
A fully realized tool will need to handle the privilege and disruption issues. 
In addition to the problems above, the method of using an umbrella application 
for both active and passive reconnaissance is questionable.  The active scanning 
applications were effectively isolated from the passive; the additional complexity of a 
master tool is not balanced by gains in efficiency or utility.  On the other hand, it might 
make sense to structure a tool in this manner if all of the control system information were 




























Control systems are a particularly vulnerable class of network devices.  
Developing effective SCADA network reconnaissance tools is one effort that can have an 
immediate impact on improving critical infrastructure security.  This thesis demonstrates 
that identification of such systems is a simple matter; other projects have demonstrated 
that attacking such systems is also an easy feat.  The information security community 
needs to develop effective solutions to protect control systems.  The control systems 
community needs to realize that they are developing information systems and that 
information assurance is a vital component of all of their efforts. 
MAC address identification, port number recognition, service interrogation, and 
equipment profiling are all effective ways of finding SCADA devices on a network.  
Most control systems assume a very trusting environment, gathering information 
remotely is often just a matter of asking a device what it is.  Thus service interrogation is 
probably the best reconnaissance method.  It is more likely to avoid the potentially 
disruptive nature of random port scans.  Still, different techniques will be useful in 
different situations. 
Nmap can be given control system device parameters and will provide all of the 
active reconnaissance functionality required.  Snort rules need to be generated and 
distributed to any site that might have control systems.  Snort can be an effective network 
reconnaissance tool by identifying unexpected and unprotected functionality in a 
network.   
In the wider information technology community, it is unforgivable to market 
devices that respond to normal network scans as poorly as some control system 
equipment.  These pieces of hardware need to be found, their dismal performance 
documented, and their active use discontinued.  Control systems should not be built with 
information technology that cannot handle information security. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
Control system engineers and network security professionals need the tools for 
securing their systems now.  Control system manufacturers need to be held accountable 
for building insecure systems so that they develop secure ones and contribute to 
protecting existing installations.  Without accountability, security is impossible to 
implement.  Network reconnaissance tools and other vulnerability scanners let customers 
know when vendors have let them down.  Along those lines, the following future work 
should be accomplished: 
• Establishment of a publicly accessible control system vulnerability 
database – This is always a political undertaking, but vendors are not 
serving their customers if they do not keep them informed. 
• Continued development of robust control system vulnerability 
scanners – There needs to be continued incorporation of control system 
information into the common IT security applications. 
o Develop service interrogation stimuli for all common control 
system protocols 
o Develop a detailed open library of device specific network 
responses 
o Develop a control system equipment profiling application 
o Research into the scanning of control system protocols that use 
RPC and DCOM technologies such as OPC and Wonderware 
• Development of measurement techniques for determining the 
progress of control system security – There should be quantifiable 
processes for demonstrating the effectiveness of the efforts taken for 
protecting critical infrastructure SCADA systems. 
• Field demonstration and testing – Reconnaissance tools need to be 
demonstrated in actual production environments in order to ensure their 
viability. 
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During the course of this research several other areas of future work were 
identified that are not as closely tied to network reconnaissance. 
 
• Device to device authentication techniques – Most of SCADA 
communications occurs between different devices, creating schemes 
where hardware can verify the authenticity of received data will contribute 
to denying access to systems by rogue devices. 
• Formal methods analysis of new SCADA protocols – Developing 
secure network protocols is not an easy task (the vulnerability of the WEP 
wireless standard is an example of this77).  The application of formal 
analysis will help insure the security of any new ones. 
• Research into SCADA worms – PLCs are highly programmable devices, 
it is conceivable that computer worms could be developed which would 
propagate themselves among such systems. 
• Wireless SCADA security – The wireless data revolution is rapidly over 
taking control systems, the impact of this technology on SCADA security 
needs to be explored in a rigorous fashion.  This concern is for existing 
common wireless technologies that are in use with control systems and for 
any control system specific wireless technologies (such as the Zigbee 
protocol). 
• Security implications of using IPv6 with SCADA – Many of the 
security aspects of the new version of the IP protocol are not understood.  
Its impact on SCADA security needs to be fully understood. 
• Improve information assurance educational tools – SCADA systems 
should not be left insecure due to ignorance.  Educational programs 
targeting control engineers’ lack of security knowledge and IT engineers’ 
lack of SCADA knowledge need to be expanded and improved.  An 
                                                 
77 Bittau 
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example of a project that could improve this would be adding the security 
of control systems to the information assurance educational tool 
CyberCEIGE.78 
 
The final area of research for SCADA reconnaissance tools is within offensive 
information operations.  Gaining control over an enemy’s critical infrastructure through 
exploitation of their automated systems offers significant benefits.  Not only would these 
activities deny the use of critical resources to the opponent, the attack could be done in a 
non-destructive manner.  Thus, instead of destroying a power plant that will need to be 
rebuilt during an occupation, it is possible to force it off-line and then just bring it back 
on when hostilities end.  Even short-term denial of service attacks would have significant 
military benefit and have much smaller collateral damage than other direct action options.  
Additionally, the costs of such an attack would be considerably less than comparable 
military action.  Rather than using a multi-million dollar missile or putting a covert action 
team at risk, remote exploitation would use the existing infrastructure against itself.  
Reconnaissance tools as the means to find and explore targets would be the first step in 
achieving that goal. 
 
                                                 
78 Cynthia Irvine 
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APPENDIX A – SCADA MAC PREFIXES 
A.1 NMAP-MAC-PREFIXES FILE 
This file normally comes with the Nmap application installation.  It was modified 
to contain only MAC OUIs which are suspected as belonging to control system vendors. 
 
# $Id: nmap-mac-prefixes 3092 2006-01-28 07:57:37Z Fyodor $ generated with make-mac-
prefixes.pl 
# Original data comes from http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/oui.txt 
# These values are known as Organizationally Unique Identifiers (OUIs) 
# See http://standards.ieee.org/faqs/OUI.html 
# 
# Nmap file modified by Ken Wiberg on 2006-08-04 to only identify control system vendors, 
includes confidence level of identification 
00000A Omron Tateisi Electronics CO. - Medium 
000023 ABB Industrial Systems AB - Low 
00002B Crisp Automation - Medium 
0000BC Allen-bradley CO. - High 
000105 Beckhoff Gmbh - Medium 
00010D Coreco - Medium 
000123 Digital Electronics - Low 
000158 Electro Industries/Gauge Tech - Medium 
0001C3 Acromag - Medium 
0001EE Comtrol Europe - Medium 
00022C ABB Bomem - Low 
000248 Pilz GmbH & Co. - Medium 
0002A2 Hilscher GmbH - Medium 
0002A3 ABB Power Automation - Medium 
0002D3 NetBotz - Medium 
000305 Smart Network Devices GmbH - Medium 
000317 Merlin Systems - Low 
00032C ABB Industrie AG - Low 
000358 Hanyang Digitech Co. - Low 
00037B Idec Izumi - Medium 
00038D PCS Revenue Control Systems - Medium 
0003AA Watlow - Medium 
0003AD Emerson Energy Systems AB - Medium 
000417 Elau AG - Medium 
000463 Bosch Security Systems - Medium 
0004D7 Omitec Instrumentation - Medium 
00054B Micro Innovation AG - Medium 
000594 Ixxat Automation Gmbh - Medium 
0005DA Apex Automationstechnik - Medium 
00063D Microwave Data Systems - Medium 
000660 Nadex Co. - Medium 
000677 Sick AG - Medium 
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000746 Interlink BT - Medium 
000768 Danfoss A/S - Medium 
0007A6 Home Automation - Medium 
0007BE DataLogic SpA - Medium 
000808 PPT Vision - Medium 
00089B ICP Electronics - Low 
0008CC Remotec - Medium 
00097E IMI Technology CO. - Low 
000991 GE Fanuc Automation Manufacturing - Medium 
0009F5 Emerson Network Power Co. - Medium 
000A44 Avery Dennison Deutschland GmbH - Low 
000A66 Mitsubishi Electric System & Service Co. - Low 
000AA9 Brooks Automation GmbH - Medium 
000ADC RuggedCom - Medium 
000AED Harting Vending G.m.b.h. & CO KG - Low 
000B17 MKS Instruments - Medium 
000B29 LG Industrial Systems Co. - Medium 
000B2D Danfoss - Medium 
000BCB Fagor Automation , S. Coop - Medium 
000BF3 BAE Systems - Low 
000C02 ABB Oy - Low 
000C1A Quest Technical Solutions - Medium 
000C62 ABB Automation Technology Products AB, Control - Medium 
000C87 ATI - Low 
000CDE ABB Stotz-kontakt Gmbh - Low 
000D1E Control Techniques - Medium 
000D81 Pepperl+Fuchs GmbH - Medium 
000D98 S.W.A.C. Schmitt-Walter Automation Consult GmbH - Medium 
000DAB Parker Hannifin GmbH Electromechanical Division Europe - Medium 
000E13 Accu-Sort Systems - Medium 
000EC1 Mynah Technologies - Medium 
000ECF Profibus Nutzerorganisation e.V. - Medium 
000EF0 Festo AG & Co. KG - Medium 
000F18 Industrial Control Systems - Medium 
000F67 West Instruments - Medium 
000F69 SEW Eurodrive GmbH & Co. KG - Medium 
000F73 Rockwell Samsung Automation - Medium 
000F9C Panduit - Medium 
000F9E Murrelektronik GmbH - Medium 
001025 Grayhill - Medium 
001048 Htrc Automation - Low 
0010C3 Csi-control Systems - Medium 
001182 IMI Norgren - Medium 
0011FC Harting Electric Gmbh &KG - Low 
00120A Emerson Electric GmbH & Co. OHG - Medium 
00121F Harding Intruments - Low 
00124F Tyco Thermal Controls - Medium 
001293 GE Energy - Low 
0012A8 intec GmbH - Low 
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0012C2 Apex Electronics Factory - Medium 
0012ED AVG Advanced Technologies - Low 
001324 Schneider Electric Ultra Terminal - Low 
001345 Eaton - Medium 
001384 Advanced Motion Controls - Medium 
001386 ABB/Totalflow - Low 
001411 Deutschmann Automation GmbH & Co. KG - Medium 
001415 Intec Automation - Medium 
0014F7 Crevis - Medium 
0014FF Precise Automation - Medium 
001524 Numatics - Medium 
00154E Hirschmann Automation and Control GmbH - Medium 
0015A6 Digital Electronics Products - Low 
0015BA iba AG - Medium 
0015DD IP Control Systems - Medium 
0015FC Startco Engineering - Medium 
00165F Fairmount Automation - Medium 
001677 Bihl+Wiedemann GmbH - Medium 
0016BD ATI Industrial Automation - Low 
002004 Yamatake-honeywell CO. - Medium 
002025 Control Technology - Medium 
002034 Rotec Industrieautomation Gmbh - Low 
00203D Novar Electronics - Low 
002096 Invensys - Medium 
00209D Lippert Automationstechnik - Medium 
0020B5 Yaskawa Electric - Medium 
003011 HMS Fieldbus Systems AB - Medium 
003056 Beck IPC GmbH - Medium 
003097 Exomatic AB - Medium 
0030A0 Tyco Submarine Systems - Medium 
0030DE Wago Kontakttechnik Gmbh - Medium 
00401A Fuji Electric CO. - Low 
0040AE Delta Controls - Medium 
0040C3 Fischer AND Porter CO. - Medium 
0050A0 Delta Computer Systems - Low 
0050CB Jetter - Medium 
0050DB Contemporary Control - Medium 
0050FF Hakko Electronics CO. - Medium 
006041 Yokogawa Electric - Medium 
0060B2 Process Control - Medium 
0060E5 Fuji Automation CO. - Low 
008074 Fisher Controls - Medium 
008094 Alfa Laval Automation AB - Medium 
0080A3 Lantronix - Medium 
00904F ABB Power T&D Company - Low 
009068 DVT - Medium 
0090DF Mitsubishi Chemical America - Low 
0090E8 Moxa Technologies - Medium 
00A03D Opto-22 - Medium 
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00A045 Phoenix Contact Gmbh & CO. - Medium 
00A0ED PRI Automation - Medium 
00C04E Comtrol - Medium 
00C0AF Teklogix - Medium 
00C0CB Control Technology - Medium 
00D024 Cognex - Medium 
00D026 Hirschmann Austria Gmbh - Medium 
00D027 Applied Automation - Low 
00D0AF Cutler-hammer - Medium 
00E067 eac Automation-consulting Gmbh - Medium 
00E07E Walt Disney Imagineering - Low 
00E090 Beckman LAB. Automation DIV. - Low 
00E0A1 Hima Paul Hildebrandt Gmbh Co. KG - Medium 
00E0C4 Horner Electric - Medium 
00E0E4 Fanuc Robotics North America - Medium 
080017 National Semiconductor - Medium 
080070 Mitsubishi Electric - Medium 
1000E8 National Semiconductor - Medium 
 
 
A.2 CROSS REFERENCED OUI LIST 
OUIs downloaded from http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/index.shtml 
(accessed August 2, 2006) 
 
Notes    
1 = Cross Referenced with Ethernet/IP Vendor List 
2 = Cross Referenced with IANA port list 
3 = Confirmed with lab equipment 
4 = Confirmed with Internet research 
5 = Suspected with Internet research 
    
OUI Organization Confidence Notes
00:00:0A Omron Tateisi Electronics CO. Medium 1 
00:00:23 ABB Industrial Systems AB Low 5 
00:00:2B Crisp Automation Medium 4 
00:00:BC Allen-bradley CO. High 3 
00:01:05 Beckhoff Gmbh Medium 1 
00:01:0D Coreco Medium 1 
00:01:23 Digital Electronics Low 1 
00:01:58 Electro Industries/Gauge Tech Medium 4 
00:01:C3 Acromag Medium 1 
00:01:EE Comtrol Europe Medium 1 
00:02:2C ABB Bomem Low 5 
00:02:48 Pilz GmbH & Co. Medium 1 
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Notes    
1 = Cross Referenced with Ethernet/IP Vendor List 
2 = Cross Referenced with IANA port list 
3 = Confirmed with lab equipment 
4 = Confirmed with Internet research 
5 = Suspected with Internet research 
    
OUI Organization Confidence Notes
00:02:A2 Hilscher GmbH Medium 1 
00:02:A3 ABB Power Automation Medium 1 
00:02:D3 NetBotz Medium 4 
00:03:05 Smart Network Devices GmbH Medium 1 
00:03:17 Merlin Systems Low 5 
00:03:2C ABB Industrie AG Low 5 
00:03:58 Hanyang Digitech Co. Low 1 
00:03:7B Idec Izumi Medium 1 
00:03:8D PCS Revenue Control Systems Medium 4 
00:03:AA Watlow Medium 1 
00:03:AD Emerson Energy Systems AB Medium 1 
00:04:17 Elau AG Medium 1 
00:04:63 Bosch Security Systems Medium 4 
00:04:D7 Omitec Instrumentation Medium 4 
00:05:4B Micro Innovation AG Medium 1 
00:05:94 Ixxat Automation Gmbh Medium 1 
00:05:DA Apex Automationstechnik Medium 4 
00:06:3D Microwave Data Systems Medium 1 
00:06:60 Nadex Co. Medium 1 
00:06:77 Sick AG Medium 1 
00:07:46 Interlink BT Medium 1 
00:07:68 Danfoss A/S Medium 1 
00:07:A6 Home Automation Medium 4 
00:07:BE DataLogic SpA Medium 1 
00:08:08 PPT Vision Medium 1 
00:08:9B ICP Electronics Low 1 
00:08:CC Remotec Medium 4 
00:09:7E IMI Technology CO. Low 1 
00:09:91 GE Fanuc Automation Manufacturing Medium 1 
00:09:F5 Emerson Network Power Co. Medium 1 
00:0A:44 Avery Dennison Deutschland GmbH Low 5 
00:0A:66 Mitsubishi Electric System & Service Co. Low 4 
00:0A:A9 Brooks Automation GmbH Medium 4 
00:0A:DC RuggedCom Medium 1 
00:0A:ED Harting Vending G.m.b.h. & CO KG Low 1 
00:0B:17 MKS Instruments Medium 1 
00:0B:29 LG Industrial Systems Co. Medium 1 
00:0B:2D Danfoss Medium 1 
00:0B:CB Fagor Automation , S. Coop Medium 4 
00:0B:F3 BAE Systems Low 5 
00:0C:02 ABB Oy Low 5 
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Notes    
1 = Cross Referenced with Ethernet/IP Vendor List 
2 = Cross Referenced with IANA port list 
3 = Confirmed with lab equipment 
4 = Confirmed with Internet research 
5 = Suspected with Internet research 
    
OUI Organization Confidence Notes
00:0C:1A Quest Technical Solutions Medium 1 
00:0C:62 ABB Automation Technology Products AB, Control Medium 1 
00:0C:87 ATI Low 5 
00:0C:DE ABB Stotz-kontakt Gmbh Low 5 
00:0D:1E Control Techniques Medium 1 
00:0D:81 Pepperl+Fuchs GmbH Medium 1 
00:0D:98 S.W.A.C. Schmitt-Walter Automation Consult GmbH Medium 1 
00:0D:AB Parker Hannifin GmbH Electromechanical Division 
Europe Medium 1 
00:0E:13 Accu-Sort Systems Medium 1 
00:0E:C1 Mynah Technologies Medium 1 
00:0E:CF Profibus Nutzerorganisation e.V. Medium 2, 4 
00:0E:F0 Festo AG & Co. KG Medium 1 
00:0F:18 Industrial Control Systems Medium 1 
00:0F:67 West Instruments Medium 1 
00:0F:69 SEW Eurodrive GmbH & Co. KG Medium 1 
00:0F:73 Rockwell Samsung Automation Medium 4 
00:0F:9C Panduit Medium 1 
00:0F:9E Murrelektronik GmbH Medium 1 
00:10:25 Grayhill Medium 1 
00:10:48 Htrc Automation Low 5 
00:10:C3 Csi-control Systems Medium 4 
00:11:82 IMI Norgren Medium 1 
00:11:FC Harting Electric Gmbh &KG Low 1 
00:12:0A Emerson Electric GmbH & Co. OHG Medium 1 
00:12:1F Harding Intruments Low 1 
00:12:4F Tyco Thermal Controls Medium 4 
00:12:93 GE Energy Low 4 
00:12:A8 intec GmbH Low 4 
00:12:C2 Apex Electronics Factory Medium 4 
00:12:ED AVG Advanced Technologies Low 5 
00:13:24 Schneider Electric Ultra Terminal Low 1 
00:13:45 Eaton Medium 1 
00:13:84 Advanced Motion Controls Medium 4 
00:13:86 ABB/Totalflow Low 5 
00:14:11 Deutschmann Automation GmbH & Co. KG Medium 1 
00:14:15 Intec Automation Medium 4 
00:14:F7 Crevis Medium 1 
00:14:FF Precise Automation Medium 4 
00:15:24 Numatics Medium 1 
00:15:4E Hirschmann Automation and Control GmbH Medium 1 
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Notes    
1 = Cross Referenced with Ethernet/IP Vendor List 
2 = Cross Referenced with IANA port list 
3 = Confirmed with lab equipment 
4 = Confirmed with Internet research 
5 = Suspected with Internet research 
    
OUI Organization Confidence Notes
00:15:A6 Digital Electronics Products Low 1 
00:15:BA iba AG Medium 1 
00:15:DD IP Control Systems Medium 4 
00:15:FC Startco Engineering Medium 1 
00:16:5F Fairmount Automation Medium 1 
00:16:77 Bihl+Wiedemann GmbH Medium 1 
00:16:BD ATI Industrial Automation Low 5 
00:20:04 Yamatake-honeywell CO. Medium 1 
00:20:25 Control Technology Medium 2, 4 
00:20:34 Rotec Industrieautomation Gmbh Low 5 
00:20:3D Novar Electronics Low 4 
00:20:96 Invensys Medium 4 
00:20:9D Lippert Automationstechnik Medium 4 
00:20:B5 Yaskawa Electric Medium 1 
00:30:11 HMS Fieldbus Systems AB Medium 4 
00:30:56 Beck IPC GmbH Medium 1 
00:30:97 Exomatic AB Medium 4 
00:30:A0 Tyco Submarine Systems Medium 4 
00:30:DE Wago Kontakttechnik Gmbh Medium 1 
00:40:1A Fuji Electric CO. Low 4 
00:40:AE Delta Controls Medium 1 
00:40:C3 Fischer AND Porter CO. Medium 4 
00:50:A0 Delta Computer Systems Low 4 
00:50:CB Jetter Medium 1 
00:50:DB Contemporary Control Medium 1 
00:50:FF Hakko Electronics CO. Medium 1 
00:60:41 Yokogawa Electric Medium 1 
00:60:B2 Process Control Medium 1 
00:60:E5 Fuji Automation CO. Low 4 
00:80:74 Fisher Controls Medium 4 
00:80:94 Alfa Laval Automation AB Medium 4 
00:80:A3 Lantronix Medium 1 
00:90:4F ABB Power T&D Company Low 5 
00:90:68 DVT Medium 1 
00:90:DF Mitsubishi Chemical America Low 4 
00:90:E8 Moxa Technologies Medium 1 
00:A0:3D Opto-22 Medium 1 
00:A0:45 Phoenix Contact Gmbh & CO. Medium 1 
00:A0:ED PRI Automation Medium 4 
00:C0:4E Comtrol Medium 1 
00:C0:AF Teklogix Medium 4 
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Notes    
1 = Cross Referenced with Ethernet/IP Vendor List 
2 = Cross Referenced with IANA port list 
3 = Confirmed with lab equipment 
4 = Confirmed with Internet research 
5 = Suspected with Internet research 
    
OUI Organization Confidence Notes
00:C0:CB Control Technology Medium 2, 4 
00:D0:24 Cognex Medium 1 
00:D0:26 Hirschmann Austria Gmbh Medium 1 
00:D0:27 Applied Automation Low 5 
00:D0:AF Cutler-hammer Medium 4 
00:E0:67 eac Automation-consulting Gmbh Medium 4 
00:E0:7E Walt Disney Imagineering Low 5 
00:E0:90 Beckman LAB. Automation DIV. Low 4 
00:E0:A1 Hima Paul Hildebrandt Gmbh Co. KG Medium 1 
00:E0:C4 Horner Electric Medium 1 
00:E0:E4 Fanuc Robotics North America Medium 1 
08:00:17 National Semiconductor Medium 1 
08:00:70 Mitsubishi Electric Medium 1 




A.3 ETHERNET/IP VENDOR LIST 
Downloaded from http://www.odva.org, Ethernet/IP Downloads section, 
EtherNetIP_VendorIDs.zip (retrieved on May 9, 2006) 
 
Company Name ID 
ABB Automation Technology 
Products AB/Robotics 
75 
ABB, Inc. 46 
Accu-Sort Systems, Inc. 25 
Acromag, Inc. 894 
AGM Electronics, Inc. 1002
AMCI-Advanced Micro Controls Inc. 10 
ARCX Inc. 1003
ATI Industrial Automation 555 
ATR Industrie-Elektronik GmbH Co. 866 
Automa SRL 883 
AutomationDirect 660 
Company Name ID 
Avery Weigh-Tronix 895 
AVG Automation 39 
B3 Systems, Inc. 990 
Baldor Electric 265 
Balluff GmbH 43 
Balogh T.A.G., Corporation 133 
Banner Engineering  12 
Beck IPC GmbH 953 
Beckhoff Automation GmbH  108 
Belden CDT Electronics Division 947 
Bihl+Wiedemann GmbH 645 
Bosch Rexroth Corporation 287 
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Company Name ID 
CDA Systems Ltd. 934 
Ci Technologies Pty Ltd (for Pelamos 
Industries) 
784 
Cisco Systems 939 
Cognex Corporation 678 
Comau S.p.A. Robotics & Final 
Assembly Division 
561 
Comtrol Corporation 909 
Contemporary Controls 209 
Control Techniques  257 
Control Techniques PLC-NA 553 
Coreco Imaging, Inc. 906 
Crevis Co., Ltd. 741 
CSIRO Mining Automation 768 
Daifuku Co., Ltd 983 
Danfoss Drives A/S 97 
Datalogic, Inc. 850 
Delta Computer Systems Inc. 590 
Deutschmann Automation GmbH & 
Co. KG 
272 
Digi International, Inc. 805 
Digital Electronics Corp. 96 
Draka USA 897 
DVT Corporation 748 
Eaton Electrical 68 
ELAU AG 986 
Electro-Matic Products Inc 984 
Emerson Process Management 
Power & Water Solutions 
903 
Emhart Teknologies 873 
Escort Memory Systems 78 
Ethernet Peripherals, Inc. 809 
EXOR Electronic R&D, Inc. 119 
Fairmount Automation, Inc. 999 
Fanuc Robotics America 356 
Festo Corporation 26 
FieldServer Technologies (Div Sierra 
Monitor Corp) 
875 
Fife Corporation 651 
FLS Automation A/S 759 
Fraba Posital GmbH 354 
Frick Controls (Div. of York 
International) 
957 
Frontline Test Equipment, Inc. 854 
GE Fanuc Automation North America, 
Inc. 
326 
Grayhill Inc. 49 
Grid Connect 940 
Hakko Electronics Co., Ltd 734 
Company Name ID 
Hanyang System 942 
Hardy Instruments, Inc. 258 
Harting, Inc. NA 778 
Hilscher GmbH 283 




HK Systems 933 
HM Computing Ltd 203 
HMS Industrial Networks AB 90 
Horner APG 86 
IBA AG 968 
ICP DAS Co., LTD 803 
IDEC IZUMI Corporation 159 
IMI Norgren 42 
Industrial Control Communication, 
Inc. 
721 
ITW Automotive Finishing 941 
IXXAT Automation GmbH 81 
Jetter AG 930 
Jokab Safety AB 950 
Lantronix, Inc. 275 
Larsen & Toubro Limited 982 
LG Industrial Systems 259 
Linux Network Services 743 
MAC Valves, Inc. 128 
Mencom Corporation 451 
Micro Innovations AG 972 
Microwave Data Systems 886 
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation 161 
MKS Instruments, CIT Group 59 
Molex Incorporated 118 
Moxa Networking Co., Ltd. 991 
Murrelektronik GmbH 640 
MYNAH Technologies 901 
NADEX Co., Ltd 155 
National Semiconductor 975 
NovaTech Process Solutions LLC 937 
N-Tron Corporation 1006
Numatics, Inc. 52 
ODVA Special Reserve 24 
OMRON Corporation 47 
OPTO-22 83 
Panduit Corporation 841 
Parker Hannifin 4 
Partlow 811 
Pepperl + Fuchs 57 
Phoenix Contact 562 
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Company Name ID 
Pilz GmbH & Co 181 
PMA GmbH 544 
PPT Vision, Inc. 921 
Process Control Corporation 812 
Pyramid Solutions, Inc. 170 
Quest Technical Solutions, Inc. 832 
Real Time Automation (C&ID) 50 
RKC Instruments Inc. 394 
Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley 1 




RuggedCom, Inc. 938 
RVSI 857 
SAE-STAHL GmbH  885 
Schneider Automation, Inc. 243 
SEW-Eurodrive GmbH & Co KG 315 
SICK AG 808 
Siempelkamp Maschinen 981 
Smart Network Devices GmbH 992 
SMC Corporation 7 
SoftPLC Corporation 851 
Software Horizons Inc. 989 
Startco Engineering Ltd 691 
StarThis Inc. 964 
SWAC Automation Consult GmbH 63 
TCS (NZ) Ltd 73 
Tennessee Rand Automation LLC 859 
The Siemon Company 635 
The Stanley Works 837 
Turck (formerly InterlinkBT LLC) 256 
Turck, Inc. 48 
Tyco Electronics 798 
Universal Dynamics 945 
WAGO Corporation 40 
Watlow Electric 153 
Welding Technology Corporation 270 
West Instruments Limited 588 
Wire-Pro, Inc. 596 
Woodhead Connectivity 638 
Woodhead Software & Electronics 
(applicom international) 
579 
Yamatake Corporation 780 
Yaskawa Electric America, Inc. 44 
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APPENDIX B – SCADA TCP/UDP PORTS 
Below is a printout of the Nmap-services file for SCADAScan.  It contains all of 
the TCP and UDP ports found to have SCADA related activity. 
Table consists of name, number and protocol (TCP or UDP), descriptions and 
confidence level. 
# SCADA service port numbers compiled from IANA port list 
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers) on 08-Aug-06 
# Put into similar format as the nmap-services file (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) 
# 
# $Id: nmap-services 0001 (SCADA) 2005-07-10 kwiberg $ 
# Other lists of services are at http://www.graffiti.com/services 
tftp 69/udp # Trivial File Transfer Protocol (Confidence Low) 
http 80/tcp # Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Confidence Low) 
dcp 93/tcp # Device Control Protocol (Confidence Low) 
dcp 93/udp # Device Control Protocol (Confidence Low) 
iccp 102/tcp # Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (Confidence 
Low) 
iccp 102/udp # Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (Confidence 
Low) 
ntp 123/udp # Network Time Protocol (Confidence Low) 
rpc-dcom 135/tcp # Remote Procedure Call, MS-DCOM (Confidence Low) 
snmp 161/udp # Simple Network Management Protocol (Confidence Low) 
rssql-trans 400/tcp # RSSql Transaction Manager (Confidence Medium) 
rssql-trans 400/udp # RSSql Transaction Manager (Confidence Medium) 
rssql-compress 401/tcp # RSSql Compression Server (Confidence Medium) 
rssql-compress 401/udp # RSSql Compression Server (Confidence Medium) 
rssql-config 402/tcp # RSSql Configuration Server (Confidence Medium) 
rssql-config 402/udp # RSSql Configuration Server (Confidence Medium) 
asa-appl-proto 502/tcp # Modbus/TCP (Confidence Medium) 
asa-appl-proto 502/udp # Modbus/TCP (Confidence Medium) 
ff-annunc 1089/tcp # FF Annunciation (Confidence High) 
ff-annunc 1089/udp # FF Annunciation (Confidence High) 
ff-fms 1090/tcp # FF Fieldbus Message Specification (Confidence High) 
ff-fms 1090/udp # FF Fieldbus Message Specification (Confidence High) 
ff-sm 1091/tcp # FF System Management (Confidence High) 
ff-sm 1091/udp # FF System Management (Confidence High) 
rnaorpc 1330/tcp # FactoryTalk Object RPC (Confidence Medium) 
rnaorpc 1330/udp # FactoryTalk Object RPC (Confidence Medium) 
rnaserv 1331/tcp # FactoryTalk Service control (Confidence Medium) 
rnaserv 1331/udp # FactoryTalk Service control (Confidence Medium) 
rnaserverping 1332/tcp # FactoryTalk Server health (Confidence Medium) 
rnaserverping 1332/udp # FactoryTalk Server health (Confidence Medium) 
ibm-mqisdp 1883/tcp # IBM MQSeries SCADA (Confidence High) 
ibm-mqisdp 1883/udp # IBM MQSeries SCADA (Confidence High) 
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ada-cip 2085/tcp # ADA Control (Confidence Low) 
ada-cip 2085/udp # ADA Control (Confidence Low) 
onehome-
remote 
2198/tcp # OneHome Remote Access (Confidence Low) 
onehome-
remote 
2198/udp # OneHome Remote Access (Confidence Low) 
onehome-help 2199/tcp # OneHome Service Port (Confidence Low) 
onehome-help 2199/udp # OneHome Service Port (Confidence Low) 
rockwell-csp1 2221/tcp # Rockwell CSP1 (Confidence High) 
rockwell-csp1 2221/udp # Rockwell CSP1 (Confidence High) 
rockwell-csp2 2222/tcp # Rockwell CSP2 (Confidence High) 
rockwell-csp2 2222/udp # Rockwell CSP2 (Confidence High) 
rockwell-csp3 2223/tcp # Rockwell CSP3 (Confidence High) 
rockwell-csp3 2223/udp # Rockwell CSP3 (Confidence High) 
rnrp 2423/tcp # RNRP (Confidence Medium) 
rnrp 2423/udp # RNRP (Confidence Medium) 
lonworks 2540/tcp # LonWorks (Confidence Medium) 
lonworks 2540/udp # LonWorks (Confidence Medium) 
lonworks2 2541/tcp # LonWorks2 (Confidence Medium) 
lonworks2 2541/udp # LonWorks2 (Confidence Medium) 
tcim-control 2729/tcp # TCIM Control (Confidence Low) 
tcim-control 2729/udp # TCIM Control (Confidence Low) 
cnrp 2757/tcp # CNRP (Confidence Medium) 
cnrp 2757/udp # CNRP (Confidence Medium) 
aimpp-hello 2846/tcp # AIMPP Hello (Confidence Low) 
aimpp-hello 2846/udp # AIMPP Hello (Confidence Low) 
aimpp-port-req 2847/tcp # AIMPP Port Req (Confidence Low) 
aimpp-port-req 2847/udp # AIMPP Port Req (Confidence Low) 
rnadirft 3060/tcp # FactoryTalk Directory Server file transfer (Confidence 
Medium) 
rnadirft 3060/udp # FactoryTalk Directory Server file transfer (Confidence 
Medium) 
triomotion 3240/tcp # Trio Motion Control Port (Confidence Low) 
triomotion 3240/udp # Trio Motion Control Port (Confidence Low) 
hicp 3250/tcp # HMS hicp port (Confidence Medium) 
hicp 3250/udp # HMS hicp port (Confidence Medium) 
anet-b 3338/tcp # OMF data b (Confidence High) 
anet-b 3338/udp # OMF data b (Confidence High) 
anet-l 3339/tcp # OMF data l (Confidence High) 
anet-l 3339/udp # OMF data l (Confidence High) 
anet-m 3340/tcp # OMF data m (Confidence High) 
anet-m 3340/udp # OMF data m (Confidence High) 
anet-h 3341/tcp # OMF data h (Confidence High) 
anet-h 3341/udp # OMF data h (Confidence High) 
sigma-port 3614/tcp # Invensys Sigma Port (Confidence Medium) 
sigma-port 3614/udp # Invensys Sigma Port (Confidence Medium) 
ff-lr-port 3622/tcp # FF LAN Redundancy Port (Confidence High) 
ff-lr-port 3622/udp # FF LAN Redundancy Port (Confidence High) 
xap-ha 3639/tcp # Extensible Automation (Confidence Low) 
xap-ha 3639/udp # Extensible Automation (Confidence Low) 
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tnmpv2 3686/tcp # Trivial Network Management (Confidence Low) 
tnmpv2 3686/udp # Trivial Network Management (Confidence Low) 
ipcs-command 3743/tcp # IP Control Systems Ltd. (Confidence Low) 
ipcs-command 3743/udp # IP Control Systems Ltd. (Confidence Low) 
c-h-it-port 3778/tcp # Cutler-Hammer IT Port (Confidence Medium) 
c-h-it-port 3778/udp # Cutler-Hammer IT Port (Confidence Medium) 
jaus 3794/tcp # JAUS Robots (Confidence Low) 
jaus 3794/udp # JAUS Robots (Confidence Low) 
scp 3820/tcp # Siemens AuD SCP (Confidence Medium) 
scp 3820/udp # Siemens AuD SCP (Confidence Medium) 
item 3848/tcp # IT Environmental Monitor (Confidence Low) 
item 3848/udp # IT Environmental Monitor (Confidence Low) 
fagordnc 3873/tcp # fagordnc (Confidence High) 
fagordnc 3873/udp # fagordnc (Confidence High) 
pnbscada 3875/tcp # PNBSCADA (Confidence Low) 
pnbscada 3875/udp # PNBSCADA (Confidence Low) 
idac 3881/tcp # Data Acquisition and Control (Confidence Low) 
idac 3881/udp # Data Acquisition and Control (Confidence Low) 
biz-prod-serv 4120/tcp # Bizware Production Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-prod-serv 4120/udp # Bizware Production Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-serv-mang 4121/tcp # Bizware Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-serv-mang 4121/udp # Bizware Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-plantmet 4122/tcp # Bizware PlantMetrics Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-plantmet 4122/udp # Bizware PlantMetrics Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-task-mang 4123/tcp # Bizware Task Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-task-mang 4123/udp # Bizware Task Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-scheduler 4124/tcp # Bizware Scheduler (Confidence Medium) 
biz-scheduler 4124/udp # Bizware Scheduler (Confidence Medium) 
biz-ctp-serv 4125/tcp # Bizware CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-ctp-serv 4125/udp # Bizware CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
camp 4450/tcp # Camp (Confidence Low) 
camp 4450/udp # Camp (Confidence Low) 
ctisystemmsg 4451/tcp # CTI System Msg (Confidence Low) 
ctisystemmsg 4451/udp # CTI System Msg (Confidence Low) 
ctiprogramload 4452/tcp # CTI Program Load (Confidence Low) 
ctiprogramload 4452/udp # CTI Program Load (Confidence Low) 
i-net-2000-npr 5069/tcp # I/Net 2000-NPR (Confidence Low) 
i-net-2000-npr 5069/udp # I/Net 2000-NPR (Confidence Low) 
wwiotalk 5413/tcp # WWIOTALK (Confidence High) 
wwiotalk 5413/udp # WWIOTALK (Confidence High) 
edas 5891/tcp # Undocumented usage by Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS 
units, models EDAS-1001E, -1002E, -1025E, -1031E 
(Confidence High) 
edas 5891/udp # Undocumented usage by Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS 
units, models EDAS-1001E, -1002E, -1025E, -1031E 
(Confidence High) 
rna-alarm-serv 6543/tcp # FactoryTalk Alarming Server (Confidence Medium) 
rna-alarm-serv 6543/udp # FactoryTalk Alarming Server (Confidence Medium) 
ctdp 7022/tcp # CT Discovery Protocol (Confidence Medium) 
ctdp 7022/udp # CT Discovery Protocol (Confidence Medium) 
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fodms 7200/tcp # FODMS FLIP (Confidence Low) 
fodms 7200/udp # FODMS FLIP (Confidence Low) 
dlip 7201/tcp # DLIP (Confidence Low) 
dlip 7201/udp # DLIP (Confidence Low) 
ft-event-multi 7600/tcp # FactoryTalk Event Multiplexor (Confidence Medium) 
ft-event-multi 7600/udp # FactoryTalk Event Multiplexor (Confidence Medium) 
ft-event-serv 7700/tcp # FactoryTalk Event Server (Confidence Medium) 
ft-event-serv 7700/udp # FactoryTalk Event Server (Confidence Medium) 
ft-dir-serv 7710/tcp # FactoryTalk Directory Server (Confidence Medium) 
ft-dir-serv 7710/udp # FactoryTalk Directory Server (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-hmi 7720/tcp # RSViewSE HMI Server (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-hmi 7720/udp # RSViewSE HMI Server (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-fram 7721/tcp # RSViewSE Server Framework (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-fram 7721/udp # RSViewSE Server Framework (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-act 7722/tcp # RSViewSE HMI Activation (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-act 7722/udp # RSViewSE HMI Activation (Confidence Medium) 
rsviewse-hist 7723/tcp # RSViewSE HMI Historical Data Log Reader (Confidence 
Medium) 
rsviewse-hist 7723/udp # RSViewSE HMI Historical Data Log Reader (Confidence 
Medium) 
biz-http-prod 8080/tcp # Bizware HTTP Product Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-http-prod 8080/udp # Bizware HTTP Product Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-http-mang 8081/tcp # Bizware HTTP Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-http-mang 8081/udp # Bizware HTTP Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
biz-http-ctp 8083/tcp # Bizware HTTP CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
biz-http-ctp 8083/udp # Bizware HTTP CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
serverviewdbms 9212/tcp # Server View dbms access (Confidence Low) 
serverviewdbms 9212/udp # Server View dbms access (Confidence Low) 
serverstart 9213/tcp # ServerStart RemoteControl (Confidence Low) 
serverstart 9213/udp # ServerStart RemoteControl (Confidence Low) 
novar-dbase 23400/tcp # Novar Data (Confidence Low) 
novar-dbase 23400/udp # Novar Data (Confidence Low) 
novar-alarm 23401/tcp # Novar Alarm (Confidence Low) 
novar-alarm 23401/udp # Novar Alarm (Confidence Low) 
novar-global 23402/tcp # Novar Global (Confidence Low) 
novar-global 23402/udp # Novar Global (Confidence Low) 
flexlm-server 27000/tcp # FlexLM Server (Confidence Medium) 
flexlm-server 27000/udp # FlexLM Server (Confidence Medium) 
profinet-rt 34962/tcp # PROFInet RT Unicast (Confidence High) 
profinet-rt 34962/udp # PROFInet RT Unicast (Confidence High) 
profinet-rtm 34963/tcp # PROFInet RT Multicast (Confidence High) 
profinet-rtm 34963/udp # PROFInet RT Multicast (Confidence High) 
profinet-cm 34964/tcp # PROFInet Context Manager (Confidence High) 
profinet-cm 34964/udp # PROFInet Context Manager (Confidence High) 
rockwell-encap 44818/tcp # Rockwell Encapsulation (Confidence High) 
rockwell-encap 44818/udp # Rockwell Encapsulation (Confidence High) 
bacnet 47808/tcp # Building Automation and Control Networks (Confidence Low) 
bacnet 47808/udp # Building Automation and Control Networks (Confidence Low) 
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APPENDIX C – SERVICE INTERROGATION FILES 
C.1. AMAP TRIGGERS 
Table consists of name, number and protocol (TCP or UDP), descriptions and 
The triggers for service interrogation using Amap are contained in the scada.trig 
file for SCADAScan.  Trigger entries have the following format: 
NAME:[COMMON_PORT,[COMMON_PORT,...]]:[IP_PROTOCOL]:0|1:TRIGGER_ST
RING 
“NAME” is the short descriptive name of the entry used to match with triggers.  
“COMMON_PORT” is a list of TCP/UDP ports that the service to be triggered normally 
listens on.  For the SCADAScan, triggers are only sent to this port.  Normal Amap 
operation is to send all triggers to all open ports discovered on a network node.  The 
potential for unpredictable behavior with control system devices precludes sending 
triggers for services to ports other than the expected one.  “IP_PROTOCOL” indicates 
whether or not to send the trigger if the listening port is TCP, UDP, or both.  The zero or 
one next subjectively indicates whether or not the trigger is potentially harmful to the 
target.  With SCADAScan, it is assumed that the triggers are designed to be harmless or 
they would not be allowed in the file.  Finally, “TRIGGER_STRING” is the data payload 
sent in the packet. 
Below is the trigger for Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS units excerpted from 
the scada.trig Amap file. 
 
# 
# SCADA specific triggers  
# 
 
# Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS units 
#   Send a SYS_INQUIRE_CMD packet to the unit 
edas:5891:tcp:0:0x05 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84 
 
This indicates that the trigger entitled “edas” is to send a packet containing the 
hexadecimal values “0x05 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 84” to TCP port 5891.  
This is the payload for a SYS_INQUIRE_CMD which elicits an identification response. 
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Below is the trigger for the Rockwell-Automation SLC505 HTTP port excerpted 
from the scada.trig Amap file.  It uses the standard port 80 service interrogation: 
 
# 
# Used to help trigger responses from the http server on: 
#     Rockwell-Automation SLC505 (1747-L551) 
http:80,81,82,8000,8080,8081,8888:tcp:”GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n” 
 
This sends a blank “Get” request to any HTTP server which should return the 
default webpage from the target. 
 
C.2. AMAP RESPONSES 
The responses received from sending out the Amap triggers are matched against a 
flat file table.  Expected response entries have the following format: 
NAME:[TRIGGER,[TRIGGER,...]]:[IP_PROTOCOL]:[MIN_LENGTH, 
MAX_LENGTH]:RESPONSE_REGEX 
“NAME” is the printed name if a response matches the entry.  “TRIGGER” is the 
name of the trigger file entry that elicited the response.  This is optional in the standard 
version of Amap but should always be used with SCADAScan.  If left out, a response 
from an unexpected trigger might match this result.  Multiple triggers can be named, but 
this is an unlikely situation when scanning SCADA applications.  “IP_PROTOCOL” 
indicates if the response was received via TCP or UDP or both.  “MIN_LENGTH” is a 
minimum length criterion that the response must match.  Likewise, “MAX_LENGTH” is 
a maximum length criterion.  “RESPONSE_REGEX” is a Perl regular expression which 
must match the response.  These regular expressions consist of a syntax of symbols used 
to compare information within the computer language Perl.79 
Below are the Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS response entries excerpted from 
the scada.resp Amap file: 
 
# 
# SCADA specific responses 
# 
edas-1001E:edas:tcp::^.....\x84\xed\x10 
                                                 







Each of the five entries requires the “edas” trigger and a TCP response.  There are 
no size requirements.  The regular expressions indicate that the responses must begin 
with five bytes of any value, followed by the hexadecimal value 84, then hexadecimal 
ED, and finally the hexadecimal value identifying the type of EDAS unit.  The response 
can contain any amount of additional information. 
Below is the response entry for any Rockwell-Automation product and then the 
specific one for the SLC505 from a webpage request trigger: 
 
# Rockwell Automation 
#   General RA webserver 
RA (http-general):http:tcp::^HTTP/1\.0 200 
OK\x20\x20\x20\x20\x0d\x0aServer: A-B WWW 
This must be a TCP response to the HTTP trigger, but there is no size limitation.  
The response payload starts with “HTTP/1.0 200 OK” followed by four spaces, a carriage 
return, and a new line.  The beginning is represented in ASCII characters, with the “.” 
escaped, while the next six characters are done in hexadecimal notation.  The fingerprint 
ends with “Server: A-B WWW” in ASCII, a sure indication that the response is coming 
from an Allen-Bradley (a subsidiary of Rockwell-Automation) webserver. 
#   SLC505 Response 
#     From http request 
RA (SLC505/1747-L551):http:tcp::^HTTP/1\.0 200 
OK\x20\x20\x20\x20\x0d\x0aServer: A-B 
WWW/0\.1.*\n.*\n.*\n<html><head><title>1747-L551 Home Page 
This response fingerprint is similar to the one above, but here there is additional 
information.  After the identification of the Allen-Bradley webserver, there is “/0.1” and 
any number of ASCII characters followed by new line.  Then two more sets of any 
number of ASCII characters followed by new line.  Finally, it ends with the beginning of 
the HTML code for a title page, “<html><head><title>1747-L551 Home Page”, which 
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APPENDIX D – EQUIPMENT PROFILES 
The table on the following four pages can be used to cross-reference listening 
ports with specific Rockwell-Automation products.80  This can be used with an 
equipment profiling reconnaissance tool for recognizing devices. 
Note that Port 25, SMTP, and Ports 67-68, DHCP/BOOTP, are NOT listening 
services on the device.  These are destination ports used by those devices for 
communication to those respective services.  They were included for matching with 
passive network captures.  They would not be shown in an active scan of the device. 
Additionally, equipment can disable ports and firewalls can prohibit 
communications with them.  Therefore, reconnaissance information might not be able to 
correctly match a device. 
                                                 
80 All of this information is available from “Q96531481 – TCP ports used by Rockwell products”, 
Rockwell Automation Knowledgebase Article (April 18, 2006), http://domino.automation.rockwell.com/ 
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1734-AENT  x  x   x   x           
1747-L55x  x  x   x    x          
1756-ENET  x  x   x              
1756-ENBT  x  x   x   x           
1756-EWEB  x  x                 
1761-NET-ENI  x  x   x              
1763-L16x    x                 
1769-L35E x x  x   x   x           
1785-LxxE  x  x   x    x          
1785-ENET  x  x   x    x          
1788-ENBT  x  x   x   x           
1794-AENT  x  x   x   x           
5820-El  x x    x    x          
CTP Server                     
FactoryTalk                     
DCOM endpoint mapper      x               
DCOM dynamic ports                     
Object RPC               x      
Service Control                x     
Server Health                 x    
Directory Server File Xfer                   x  
Alarming Server                     
Event Multiplexor                     
Event Server                     
Directory Server                     
License Server                     
Foundation Fieldbus            x x x      x
INTERCHANGE           x          
PanelView  x  x   x              
PowerFlex Drives  x  x   x              
PowerMonitor II           x          
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1734-AENT                    x
1747-L55x                    x
1756-ENET                    x
1756-ENBT                    x
1756-EWEB                    x
1761-NET-ENI                    x
1763-L16x                    x
1769-L35E                    x
1785-LxxE                    x
1785-ENET                    x
1788-ENBT                    x
1794-AENT                    x
5820-El                     
CTP Server                  x   
FactoryTalk                     
DCOM endpoint mapper                     
DCOM dynamic ports       x              
Object RPC                     
Service Control                     
Server Health                     
Directory Server File Xfer                     
Alarming Server        x             
Event Multiplexor         x            
Event Server          x           
Directory Server           x          
License Server                   x  
Foundation Fieldbus                     
INTERCHANGE                    x
PanelView                    x
PowerFlex Drives                    x
PowerMonitor II                     
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RSMACC      x            x   
RSLinx           x          
RSLinx Enterprise                     
RSBizware x   x                 
Production Server                     
Reports                     
Task Manager                     
Scheduler Server                     
Scheduler CTP Server                     
Server Manager                     
PlantMetrics Server                     
RSView32    x                 
RSView32SE    x                 
HMI Server                     
Server Framework                     
HMI Activation                     
Historical Data Log Reader                     
RSView Messenger x                    
RSSql x                    
Transaction Manager         x            
Compression Server         x            
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RSMACC                     
RSLinx                    x
RSLinx Enterprise                    x
RSBizware                     
Production Server x               x     
Reports                x     
Task Manager    x                 
Scheduler Server     x                
Scheduler CTP Server      x               
Server Manager  x               x    
PlantMetrics Server   x                  
RSView32                     
RSView32SE                     
HMI Server            x         
Server Framework             x        
HMI Activation              x       
Historical Data Log Reader               x      
RSView Messenger                     
RSSql                     
Transaction Manager                     
Compression Server                     
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APPENDIX E – SNORT CONFIGURATION 
E.1 SNORT.SCADA.CONF 
Below is a printout of the snort.scada.conf file that configures Snort to run for the 
SCADAScan tool. 
 
# This is the snort config file used by SCADAScan 
# to passively monitor for control system traffic 
# 
# It is based off of the snort.conf file 
# 
# Last modified by Ken Wiberg 2006-08-15 
# 
# Set the Home network address to the one eth0 is on 
var HOME_NET $eth0_ADDRESS 
# Set up external network is any other than the home network 
var EXTERNAL_NET !$HOME_NET 
# Relative path to the SCADA rule set 
var SCADA_PATH . 
 
# Use the scada classification and priority settings 
include $SCADA_PATH/classification.scada.conf 
# SCADA reference systems (relative path) 
include $SCADA_PATH/reference.scada.conf 
 
# Change the user and group after initialization 
#  This will need to be modified on an installation basis 
config set_gid: 1001 
config set_uid: 1001 
# Set the alert file to alert.scada 
config alertfile: alert.scada 
# Set the log file directory to snort_files 
config logdir: snort_files 
# Don't log packet contents 
config nolog 
 
config flowbits_size: 256 
 
# SCADA rule set path (relative path) 
include $SCADA_PATH/rules.scada 







Below is a printout of the rules.scada file for the SCADAScan tool.  It includes all 
of the detection criteria for control systems determined during research for this thesis. 
Rules consist of: 
• Type = “alert” for all of these, so that snort produces an alert to the 
reporting system 
• Protocol = either TCP or UDP for all of these 
• Senders IP = any for all of these, so that no IP address is left out of an alert 
• Senders Port = varies, this is used to identify SCADA protocols 
• Direction = “<>”, so that it does not matter which way the communication 
is going 
• Receivers IP and Port = “any any”, so that no IP address or port is left out 
• A message to be generated when that rule is fired 
• A classification of the rule, giving a subjective confidence in the 
identification of the communication detected 
• A threshold construction, so that only one alert is generated per rule per IP 
• A rule identification number for bookkeeping 
• A rule revision number for bookkeeping 
 
# Snort rules for passive SCADA system reconnaissance 
#  
# Created by Ken Wiberg 21-Aug-06 
#  
# Identify traffic to Trivial File Transfer Protocol (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 69 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trivial File 
Transfer Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000001; 
rev:0;) 
alert udp any 69 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trivial File 
Transfer Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000002; 
rev:0;) 
 97
# Identify traffic to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (web) (Confidence 
Low) 
alert tcp any 80 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (web) Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000003; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 80 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (web) Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000004; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Device Control Protocol (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 93 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Device Control 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000005; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 93 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Device Control 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000006; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol 
(Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 102 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Inter-Control 
Center Communications Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-
suspected; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; 
sid:1000007; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 102 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Inter-Control 
Center Communications Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-
suspected; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; 
sid:1000008; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Network Time Protocol (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 123 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Network Time 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000009; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 123 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Network Time 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000010; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Remote Procedure Call, MS-DCOM (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 135 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Remote Procedure 
Call, MS-DCOM Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000011; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 135 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Remote Procedure 
Call, MS-DCOM Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000012; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Simple Network Management Protocol (Confidence 
Low) 
alert tcp any 161 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Simple Network 
Management Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000013; 
rev:0;) 
alert udp any 161 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Simple Network 
Management Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000014; 
rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSSql Transaction Manager (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 400 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Transaction 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000015; rev:0;) 
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alert udp any 400 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Transaction 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000016; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSSql Compression Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 401 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Compression 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000017; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 401 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Compression 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000018; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSSql Configuration Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 402 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Configuration 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000019; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 402 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSSql Configuration 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000020; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Modbus/TCP (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 502 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Modbus/TCP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000021; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 502 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Modbus/TCP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000022; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FF Annunciation (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 1089 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF Annunciation 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000023; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1089 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF Annunciation 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000024; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FF Fieldbus Message Specification (Confidence 
High) 
alert tcp any 1090 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF Fieldbus 
Message Specification Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000025; 
rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1090 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF Fieldbus 
Message Specification Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000026; 
rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FF System Management (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 1091 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF System 
Management Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000027; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1091 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF System 
Management Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000028; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Object RPC (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 1330 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Object 
RPC Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000029; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1330 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Object 
RPC Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000030; rev:0;) 
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# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Service control (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 1331 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Service control Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000031; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1331 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Service control Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000032; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Server health (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 1332 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Server 
health Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000033; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1332 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Server 
health Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000034; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to IBM MQSeries SCADA (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 1883 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable IBM MQSeries SCADA 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000035; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 1883 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable IBM MQSeries SCADA 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000036; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to ADA Control (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 2085 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected ADA Control 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000037; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2085 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected ADA Control 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000038; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OneHome Remote Access (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 2198 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected OneHome Remote 
Access Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000039; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2198 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected OneHome Remote 
Access Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000040; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OneHome Service Port (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 2199 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected OneHome Service 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000041; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2199 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected OneHome Service 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000042; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Rockwell CSP1 (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 2221 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP1 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000043; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2221 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP1 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000044; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Rockwell CSP2 (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 2222 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP2 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000045; rev:0;) 
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alert udp any 2222 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP2 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000046; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Rockwell CSP3 (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 2223 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP3 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000047; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2223 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell CSP3 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000048; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RNRP (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 2423 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RNRP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000049; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2423 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RNRP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000050; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to LonWorks (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 2540 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible LonWorks 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000051; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2540 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible LonWorks 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000052; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to LonWorks2 (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 2541 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible LonWorks2 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000053; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2541 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible LonWorks2 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000054; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to TCIM Control (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 2729 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected TCIM Control 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000055; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2729 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected TCIM Control 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000056; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to CNRP (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 2757 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible CNRP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000057; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2757 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible CNRP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000058; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to AIMPP Hello (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 2846 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected AIMPP Hello 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000059; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2846 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected AIMPP Hello 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000060; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to AIMPP Port Req (Confidence Low) 
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alert tcp any 2847 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected AIMPP Port Req 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000061; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 2847 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected AIMPP Port Req 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000062; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Directory Server file transfer 
(Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 3060 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Directory Server file transfer Communications"; classtype:scada-
possible; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; 
sid:1000063; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3060 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Directory Server file transfer Communications"; classtype:scada-
possible; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; 
sid:1000064; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Trio Motion Control Port (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3240 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trio Motion 
Control Port Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000065; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3240 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trio Motion 
Control Port Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000066; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to HMS hicp port (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 3250 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible HMS hicp port 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000067; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3250 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible HMS hicp port 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000068; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OMF data b (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3338 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data b 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000069; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3338 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data b 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000070; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OMF data l (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3339 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data l 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000071; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3339 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data l 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000072; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OMF data m (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3340 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data m 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000073; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3340 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data m 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000074; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to OMF data h (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3341 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data h 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000075; rev:0;) 
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alert udp any 3341 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable OMF data h 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000076; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Invensys Sigma Port (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 3614 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Invensys Sigma 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000077; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3614 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Invensys Sigma 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000078; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FF LAN Redundancy Port (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3622 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF LAN Redundancy 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000079; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3622 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable FF LAN Redundancy 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000080; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Extensible Automation (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3639 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Extensible 
Automation Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000081; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3639 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Extensible 
Automation Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000082; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Trivial Network Management (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3686 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trivial Network 
Management Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000083; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3686 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Trivial Network 
Management Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000084; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to IP Control Systems Ltd. (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3743 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected IP Control 
Systems Ltd. Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000085; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3743 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected IP Control 
Systems Ltd. Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000086; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Cutler-Hammer IT Port (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 3778 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Cutler-Hammer IT 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000087; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3778 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Cutler-Hammer IT 
Port Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000088; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to JAUS Robots (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3794 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected JAUS Robots 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000089; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3794 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected JAUS Robots 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000090; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Siemens AuD SCP (Confidence Medium) 
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alert tcp any 3820 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Siemens AuD SCP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000091; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3820 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Siemens AuD SCP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000092; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to IT Environmental Monitor (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3848 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected IT Environmental 
Monitor Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000093; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3848 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected IT Environmental 
Monitor Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000094; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to fagordnc (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 3873 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable fagordnc 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000095; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3873 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable fagordnc 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000096; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to PNBSCADA (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3875 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected PNBSCADA 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000097; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3875 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected PNBSCADA 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000098; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Data Acquisition and Control (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 3881 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Data Acquisition 
and Control Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000099; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 3881 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Data Acquisition 
and Control Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000100; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware Production Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4120 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Production 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000101; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4120 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Production 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000102; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4121 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Server 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000103; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4121 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Server 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000104; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware PlantMetrics Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4122 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware 
PlantMetrics Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000105; 
rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4122 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware 
PlantMetrics Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; 
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threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000106; 
rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware Task Manager (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4123 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Task 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000107; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4123 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Task 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000108; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware Scheduler (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4124 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Scheduler 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000109; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4124 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware Scheduler 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000110; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 4125 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware CTP Server 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000111; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4125 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware CTP Server 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000112; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Camp (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 4450 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Camp 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000113; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4450 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Camp 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000114; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to CTI System Msg (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 4451 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected CTI System Msg 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000115; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4451 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected CTI System Msg 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000116; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to CTI Program Load (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 4452 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected CTI Program Load 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000117; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 4452 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected CTI Program Load 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000118; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to I/Net 2000-NPR (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 5069 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected I/Net 2000-NPR 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000119; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 5069 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected I/Net 2000-NPR 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000120; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to WWIOTALK (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 5413 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable WWIOTALK 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000121; rev:0;) 
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alert udp any 5413 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable WWIOTALK 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000122; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Intelligent Instrumentation EDAS units, models 
EDAS-1001E, -1002E, -1025E, -1031E (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 5891 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Intelligent 
Instrumentation EDAS units, models EDAS-1001E, -1002E, -1025E, -1031E 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000123; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 5891 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Intelligent 
Instrumentation EDAS units, models EDAS-1001E, -1002E, -1025E, -1031E 
Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000124; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Alarming Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 6543 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Alarming Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000125; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 6543 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Alarming Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000126; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to CT Discovery Protocol (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7022 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible CT Discovery 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000127; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7022 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible CT Discovery 
Protocol Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000128; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FODMS FLIP (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 7200 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected FODMS FLIP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000129; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7200 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected FODMS FLIP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000130; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to DLIP (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 7201 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected DLIP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000131; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7201 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected DLIP 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000132; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Event Multiplexor (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7600 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Event 
Multiplexor Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000133; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7600 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Event 
Multiplexor Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000134; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Event Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7700 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Event 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000135; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7700 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk Event 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000136; rev:0;) 
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# Identify traffic to FactoryTalk Directory Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7710 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Directory Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000137; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7710 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FactoryTalk 
Directory Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000138; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSViewSE HMI Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7720 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000139; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7720 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000140; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSViewSE Server Framework (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7721 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE Server 
Framework Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000141; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7721 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE Server 
Framework Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000142; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSViewSE HMI Activation (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7722 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Activation Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000143; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7722 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Activation Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000144; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to RSViewSE HMI Historical Data Log Reader 
(Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 7723 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Historical Data Log Reader Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000145; 
rev:0;) 
alert udp any 7723 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible RSViewSE HMI 
Historical Data Log Reader Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; 
threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000146; 
rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware HTTP Product Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 8080 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP 
Product Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000147; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 8080 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP 
Product Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000148; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware HTTP Server Manager (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 8081 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP 
Server Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000149; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 8081 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP 
Server Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000150; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Bizware HTTP CTP Server (Confidence Medium) 
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alert tcp any 8083 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP CTP 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000151; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 8083 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible Bizware HTTP CTP 
Server Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000152; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Server View dbms access (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 9212 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Server View dbms 
access Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000153; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 9212 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Server View dbms 
access Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000154; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to ServerStart RemoteControl (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 9213 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected ServerStart 
RemoteControl Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000155; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 9213 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected ServerStart 
RemoteControl Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000156; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Novar Data (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 23400 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Data 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000157; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 23400 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Data 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000158; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Novar Alarm (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 23401 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Alarm 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000159; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 23401 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Alarm 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000160; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Novar Global (Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 23402 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Global 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000161; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 23402 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Novar Global 
Communications"; classtype:scada-suspected; threshold: type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000162; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to FlexLM Server (Confidence Medium) 
alert tcp any 27000 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FlexLM Server 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000163; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 27000 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Possible FlexLM Server 
Communications"; classtype:scada-possible; threshold: type limit, track 
by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000164; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to PROFInet RT Unicast (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 34962 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet RT 
Unicast Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000165; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 34962 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet RT 
Unicast Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000166; rev:0;) 
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# Identify traffic to PROFInet RT Multicast (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 34963 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet RT 
Multicast Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000167; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 34963 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet RT 
Multicast Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000168; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to PROFInet Context Manager (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 34964 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet Context 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000169; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 34964 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable PROFInet Context 
Manager Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: type 
limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000170; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Rockwell Encapsulation (Confidence High) 
alert tcp any 44818 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell 
Encapsulation Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000171; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 44818 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Probable Rockwell 
Encapsulation Communications"; classtype:scada-probable; threshold: 
type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; sid:1000172; rev:0;) 
# Identify traffic to Building Automation and Control Networks 
(Confidence Low) 
alert tcp any 47808 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Building 
Automation and Control Networks Communications"; classtype:scada-
suspected; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 300; 
sid:1000173; rev:0;) 
alert udp any 47808 <> any any (msg:"SCADA - Suspected Building 
Automation and Control Networks Communications"; classtype:scada-





APPENDIX F – PERL CODE FOR SCADASCAN PROJECT 
The SCADAScan code-base consists of one Perl script file and five Perl modules 
referenced by the main script.  Below are printouts of the Perl Code. 
 
F.1  SCADASCAN.PL 
#!/usr/bin/perl -w 
 
# Library set up 
use lib "modules"; 
use strict; 
use warnings; 
use preprocess (); 
use setoptions (); 
use runnmap (); 
use runamap (); 
use runsnort (); 
 
# Globals 
our %options = ( 
        "active"  => 0, 
        "passive" => 0, 




### Main Routine ###### 
# 
if (preprocess::are_requirements_met() ){ 
    # Check options for what we are doing 
    %options = setoptions::set_options(); 
    # Run active scan 
    if ($options{active}) { 
        print "###  SCADAScan - Active Scan                        
###\n"; 
        # Run the Nmap scanner to find systems and ports 
        my @scada_found = runnmap::run_scan($ARGV[0]); 
        # Run the Amap scanner to identify specific devices/protocols 
        my @amap_found = runamap::run_scan(@scada_found); 
        print "\n\n###  SCADAScan Active Scan complete!  ###\n"; 
    # Run passive scan 
    } elsif ($options{passive}) { 
        # snort requires running as root... 
        # I don't really handle it hear letting the user sudo scadascan 
instead 
        my @snort_found = runsnort::run_scan(); 
    } 
} else { 





### End Main ######## 
 
 






#   Checks for installations of nmap, amap, and snort 
#   Ensures that they are all of the correct versions 
#  
# Created by KW 
# Modified by KW 25-Jun-06 
# 
############### 
# Library set up 
use warnings; 
use strict; 
# Export set up 
use Exporter; 
our @ISA = qw/Exporter/; 
our @EXPORT_OK = qw(are_requirements_met); 
our @EXPORT=qw(are_requirements_met); 
# Function declarations 
sub are_requirements_met; 







sub are_requirements_met { 
    #check all of the requirements for running scada scan 
    #if they are all ok, return 1, if not return 0 
    my $return_value = 1; 
    if (not find_application("nmap")){ # Is nmap installed? 
        print "Nmap NOT found!\nAn installation of Nmap is required for 
operation of ScadaScan\n"; 
        $return_value = 0; 
    } else { # nmap is there is it the right version? 
        if (not is_nmap_version_ok){  
            print "Nmap is NOT a compatible version!\nNmap must be at 
least version 4.01.\n"; 
            $return_value = 0; 
        } 
    } 
    if (not find_application("amap")){ 
        print "Amap NOT found!\nAn installation of Amap is required for 
operation of ScadaScan\n"; 
        $return_value = 0; 
    } else { # amap is there is it the right version? 
 111
        if (not is_amap_version_ok){  
            print "Amap is NOT a compatible version!\nAmap must be at 
least version 5.2.\n"; 
            $return_value = 0; 
        } 
    } 
    if (not find_application("snort")){ 
        print "Snort NOT found!\nAn installation of Snort is required 
for operation of ScadaScan\n"; 
        $return_value = 0; 
    } else { # snort is there is it the right version? 
        if (not is_snort_version_ok){  
            print "Snort is NOT a compatible version!\nSnort must be at 
least version 2.3.2.\n"; 
            $return_value = 0; 
        } 
    } 
    return $return_value; 
} 
 
sub find_application ($) { 
    #do a which to find the location of an application, 
    #returns the location or an empty string 
    my $application = shift; 
    my $which_result; 
    my $return_value = ""; 
    $which_result = qx{which $application}; 
    if ($which_result =~ /$application/){ 
        $return_value = $which_result; 
    } 
    return $return_value; 
} 
 
### Functions for checking application versions ### 
# 
# Unfortunately, amap and snort do not use standard "--version" flags 
for 
# determining application versions.  Therefore we are required to have 
a 
# custom function for finding the version number for each of the 
applications. 
# Additionally, new versions of the applications might do this a very 
different 
# way, so we are stuck with modifying this whenever new versions come 
out... 
# 
sub is_nmap_version_ok { 
    #find the application version by calling "nmap --version" 
    #returns 1 for ok, 0 for not ok 
    my $return_value = 0; 
    $_ = `nmap --version`; 
    if (/(\d+\.\d+)/){  #the paranthesis around the regex are required 
to shove it into $1... 
        if ($1 >= 4.01) { 
            $return_value = 1; 
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        } 
    } 
    return $return_value; 
} 
 
sub is_snort_version_ok { 
    #find the application version by calling "snort --V" 
    #returns 1 for ok, 0 for not ok 
    my $return_value = 0; 
    $_ = `snort -V 2>&1`; #What a pain, snort sends this output to 
sterr... 
    if (/(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)/){ 
        my @version = split /\./, $1; 
        if ($version[0] > 2){ 
            $return_value = 1; #we've got higher than major version 2 
        } elsif ($version[0] == 2) { 
            if ($version[1] > 3){ #we've got higher than minor version 
3 
                $return_value = 1; 
            } elsif ($version[1] ==3) { 
                if ($version[2] >= 2){ #we've got equal or higher 
incremental version 2 
                    $return_value = 1; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    return $return_value; 
} 
 
sub is_amap_version_ok { 
    #find the application version by calling "amap --version" which is 
an illegal flag 
    #but amap spits out version information in its error message 
    #returns 1 for ok, 0 for not ok 
    my $return_value = 0; 
    $_ = `amap`;  
    if (/(v\d+\.\d+)/){ 
        my $temp = substr $1, 1; 
        my @version = split /\./, $temp; 
        if ($version[0] > 5){ 
            $return_value = 1; #we've got higher than major version 5 
        } elsif ($version[0] == 5) { 
            if ($version[1] >= 2){ #we've got equal or higher than 
minor version 2 
                $return_value = 1; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    return $return_value; 
} 
# 










#   Figure out what options are set and set the environment 
#   variables accordingly.  Runs a few of the simple options. 
#  
# Created by KW 
# Modified by KW 25-Jun-06 
# 
############### 




# Export set up 
use Exporter; 
our @ISA = qw/Exporter/; 
our @EXPORT_OK = qw(set_options); 
our @EXPORT=qw(set_options); 
our %options; 







sub set_options { 
    my %options; 
    my %options_out = ( 
        "active"  => 0, 
        "passive" => 0, 
    ); 
 
    # Allow bundling of single dash arguments 
    Getopt::Long::Configure("bundling"); 
    GetOptions(\%options, "help|h|?", "version|v", "nmap:s", "amap:s", 
"snort:s",  
               "active|a", "passive|p"); 
    # Single action arguments 
    if ($options{help}){ #print usage 
        print_usage; 
        exit 0; 
    } elsif ($options{version}){ #print version 
        print_version; 
        exit 0; 
    } elsif (exists $options{nmap}){ #run nmap 
        run_application("nmap", $options{nmap}); 
        exit 0; 
    } elsif (exists $options{amap}){ #run amap 
        run_application("amap", $options{amap}); 
        exit 0; 
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    } elsif (exists $options{snort}){ #run snort 
        run_application("snort", $options{snort}); 
        exit 0; 
    } elsif ($options{passive}){ #run passive scan 
        $options_out{passive} = 1; 
    } elsif (!exists $ARGV[0]) { #no options selected print out the 
usage 
        print "Scadascan requires a target, none specified!\n\n"; 
        print_usage; 
        exit 0; 
    # Set up the options to run here 
    } elsif ($options{active}){ #run active scan 
        $options_out{active} = 1; 
    } else { 
        print_usage; 
        exit 0; 
    } 
    @_ = %options_out; 
} 
######## 
# print_usage - print out the usage information 
# 
sub print_usage { 
    print_version; 
    print <<EOF; 
 
Syntax: scadascan [--help|--version| 
                   --active|--passive| 
                   --nmap="options"| 
                   --amap="options| 
                   --snort="options"] 
                   target 
 
  --help|-?|-h : This help message 
   
  --active|a   : Initiate an active scan for SCADA devices 
                 at the target 
                  
  --passive|p  : Initiate a passive scan on the current 
                 network 
   
  --version|-v : Print version on standard output and exit 
   
  --nmap       : Fork to nmap directly, exiting scadascan, 
                 and passing the options to nmap 
                 
  --amap       : Fork to amap directly, exiting scadascan, 
                 and passing the options to amap 
                 
  --snort      : Fork to snort directly, exiting scadascan, 
                 and passing the options to snort 
                  
  target       : A target range of IP addresses using the 






# print_version - print out the version information 
# 
sub print_version { 
    print <<EOF; 






# run_application - run nmap, amap, or snort directly 
#     with the passed parameters.  Exiting Scadascan entirely. 
#     Applications are run with their own defaults (i.e. none 
#     of the Scada specific fingerprinting files) 
# 
sub run_application ($$) { 
    my $application = shift; 
    my $app_options = shift; 
    print_version; 
    if (!$app_options eq "") {$app_options = " ".$app_options}; 
    print qq|\nExiting ScadaScan and executing 
"$application$app_options" directly... \n\n|; 
    exec $application $app_options; 










#   Runs an active nmap scans 
#  
# Created by KW 
# Modified by KW 19-Jul-06 
# 
############### 
# Library set up 
use warnings; 
use strict; 
# Export set up 
use Exporter; 
our @ISA = qw/Exporter/; 
our @EXPORT_OK = qw(run_scan); 
our @EXPORT=qw(run_scan); 
# Function declarations 





sub run_scan ($) { 
    # Run a Nmap scan on the passed target(s) 
    print "###  Running NMAP scan to find hosts and ports....  ###\n"; 
    my @return_value = 1; 
    my $target = shift; 
    my $execute_nmap = "nmap -F -v -n -oG nmap_results --datadir 
nmap_files "; 
    $execute_nmap =  $execute_nmap . $target . " 2>&1 |"; #include 
sterr in stout 
    # run with root privileges, requires setting up sudo 
    $execute_nmap = "sudo " . $execute_nmap; 
    open NMAP, $execute_nmap or die "fork : $!"; 
    while (<NMAP>) { 
        print $_; 
    } 
    close NMAP; 
    my @scada_hosts_found; 
    my @scada_ports_found; 
    if (open NMAP_RESULTS, "<", "nmap_results"){ 
        while (<NMAP_RESULTS>){ 
            if (m{^Host:\s*(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+).+Ports:\s*(.+///)}){ 
                my $scada_host = $1; 
                @scada_ports_found = split /,/, $2; 
                my $scada_port; 
                foreach $scada_port (@scada_ports_found){ 
                    $scada_port =~ m{\d+}; 
                    unshift(@scada_hosts_found, $scada_host, $&); 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        close NMAP_RESULTS; 
    } else { 
        die "Cannot open nmap_results file!: $!\n"; 
    } 










#   Runs an active amap scans 
#  
# Created by KW 
# Modified by KW 21-Jul-06 
# 
############### 
# Library set up 
use warnings; 
use strict; 
# Export set up 
use Exporter; 
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our @ISA = qw/Exporter/; 
our @EXPORT_OK = qw(run_scan); 
our @EXPORT=qw(run_scan); 
# Function declarations 
sub run_scan  (@); 
sub run_single_scan ($$$); 




sub run_scan (@) { 
    # Run an Amap scan on the passed target(s) 
    my @return_value; 
    my @scada_found = @_; 
 
    print "\n###  Running AMAP scan to verify ports and applications  
###\n"; 
    my $i = 0; 
    while (defined $scada_found[$i]){ 
        # Get protocol names from port number 
        my @protocols = find_amap_protocol $scada_found[$i+1]; 
        # Only run scans on protocols with triggers 
        if (defined $protocols[0]) { 
            foreach my $protocol (@protocols) { # Loop thru all 
protocols 
                push @return_value, run_single_scan 
                    ($scada_found[$i], $scada_found[$i+1], $protocol); 
            } 
        } else { 
            printf "\n###  Skipping AMAP scan on %s Port: %s - no 
triggers found  ###\n", 
                $scada_found[$i], $scada_found[$i+1]; 
        } 
        $i = $i + 2; 
    } 
    return @return_value; 
} 
######## 
# run_single_scan - run a single amap scan on the target 
# 
#       Passed parameter - string target, numeric port number 
#       Returned value - amap output as array 
# 
sub run_single_scan ($$$) { 
    # Run an Amap scan on the passed target and port 
    # using only the triggers for the passed application 
    my @return_value; 
    my $target = shift; 
    my $target_port = shift; 
    my $application = shift; 
     
    printf "\n###  Executing AMAP on %s Port: %s  ###\n###  Sending 
triggers for %s protocol  ###\n", 
        $target, $target_port, $application; 
    # Piece together command 
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    my $execute_amap = 
        "amap -A -D amap_files/scada -p " . $application . 
        " -R " . $target . " " . $target_port . " 2>&1 |"; #include 
sterr in stout 
    # Execute Amap with the above command, keeping it open so that 
    #     output is immediately printed 
    open AMAP, $execute_amap; 
    while (<AMAP>) { 
        # Print Amap output 
        print $_; 
        # Push Amap output onto return array 
        push @return_value, $_; 
    } 
    close AMAP; 
    return @return_value; 
} 
######## 
# find_amap_protocol - find the protocol within the amap triggers file 
# 
#       Passed parameter - numeric port number 
#       Returned value - undefined for no matches, protocol names for 
matches 
# 
sub find_amap_protocol ($) { 
    my @return_value; 
    my $port = shift; 
    my @protocol; 
     
    # Open the Amap triggers file for scada devices 
    if (open AMAP_TRIGGERS, "<", "amap_files/scada.trig"){ 
        while (<AMAP_TRIGGERS>){ # read the file line by line 
            # if this line is not a comment or just whitespace and 
newline 
            if (not m{^\s*#.*|^\s*\n}) { # find an actual specification 
                my @split_string = split /:/; # split the line at 
colons 
                # if we have a second element that matches the port 
                if (defined $split_string[1] && $split_string[1] =~ 
m{\b$port\b}) { 
                    push @protocol, $split_string[0]; # set the 
protocol name to the first element 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        close AMAP_TRIGGERS; 
    } else { 
        die "Cannot open amap_files/scada.trig file!: $!\n"; 
    } 














#   Runs the  passive snort scans 
#  
# Created by KW 
# Modified by KW 19-Aug-06 
# 
############### 
# Library set up 
use warnings; 
use strict; 
# Export set up 
use Exporter; 
our @ISA = qw/Exporter/; 
our @EXPORT_OK = qw(run_snort); 
our @EXPORT=qw(run_snort); 
# Global used in interrupt handling 
my $int_count; 
# Function declarations 
sub run_scan  (); 
# Interrupt handling mechanism 
sub my_int_handler (); 
$SIG{'INT'} = 'runsnort::my_int_handler'; 
1; 
 
sub run_scan () { 
    # Run an Amap scan on the passed target(s) 
    my @return_value = ""; 
 
    print "\n###  Running Snort scan to listen for SCADA systems  
###\n"; 
 
    # Open an output alert file 
    if ( ! open OUTPUT, ">>alert.scada") { 
            die "Could not open alert.scada file: $!\n"; 
    } 
    $int_count = 0; 
    my $execute_snort = "snort -A console -c 
snort_files/snort.scada.conf 2>&1 |"; 
    # Following line allows development in a non-root environment after 
intial sudo 
    $execute_snort = "sudo " . $execute_snort; 
    open SNORT, $execute_snort or die "fork : $!"; 
    while (<SNORT>) { 
        print STDOUT $_; # Output everything to STDOUT 
        if (m/SCADA/){ # Put only SCADA alerts into alert.scada file 
            print OUTPUT $_; 
        } 
        if ($int_count) { # Interrupt detected, keep printing last 
lines, then exit 
            print STDOUT "\n### SCADAScan Passive Scan stopped\n ###"; 
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            print STDOUT "### Shutting down Snort ###\n\n"; 
            $int_count = 0; 
        } 
    } 
    print "### SCADAScan Passive detection shut down!!! ###\n"; 
    close SNORT; 
    close OUTPUT; 
    return @return_value; 
} 
 
# Handle the Interrupts to shutdown snort 
sub my_int_handler () { 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3. Hugo A. Badillo 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




5. John Campbell 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
6. Deborah Cooper 
DC Associates, LLC 
Roslyn, VA 
 
7. CDR Daniel L. Currie 
PMW 161 
San Diego, CA 
 
8. Louise Davidson 
National Geospatial Agency 
Bethesda, MD 
 




10. Vincent J. DiMaria 
National Security Agency 








12. Dr. Diana Gant 
National Science Foundation 
 




14. Richard Hale 
DISA 
Falls Church, VA 
 
15. CDR Scott  D. Heller 
SPAWAR 
San Diego, CA 
 












19. Dr. Carl Landwehr 
DTO 
Fort George T. Meade, MD 
 
20. Steve LaFountain 
 NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 











23. Dr. Vic Maconachy 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
24. Doug Maughan 
Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, DC 
 








27. Mark T. Powell 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
28. Jim Roberts 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Reston, VA 
 
29. Jon Rolf 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




31. Keith Schwalm 
Good Harbor Consulting, LLC 
Washington, DC 
 
32. Charles Sherupski 
Sherassoc 
Round Hill, VA 
 
 124
33. Ken Shotting 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
34. CDR Wayne Slocum 
SPAWAR 
San Diego, CA 
 








37. CAPT Robert Zellmann 
CNO Staff N614 
Arlington, VA 
 
38. Dr. Cynthia E. Irvine 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
39. Kenneth Wiberg 
Civilian, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
40. Dr. George Dinolt 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
41. Professor Karen Burke 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 














45. Donald Wiberg 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
Santa Cruz, CA 
 
46. Jason Stamp 
Sandia National Laboratory 
 
 
